BC 



THE 

THINKING 

PROCESS 



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NATHAN A. HARVEY 

STATE NORMAL COLLEGE 
YPSILANTI, MICHIGAN 



J 




Class i 

Book 

Copyright^ . 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 



The Thinking Process 



NATHAN A. HARVEY 

STATE NORMAL COLLEGE 
YPSILANTI, MICHIGAN 



Copyright 1910 
NATHAN A. HARVEY 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



CHAPTER 


PAGE 


I. Laws of Association .... 


7 


II. Formation of the General Abstract Notion 


20 


III. Properties of the General Abstract Notion 


34 


IV. Judgment ...... 


42 


V. The Syllogism 


51 


VI. Deductive and Inductive Reasoning 


62 


VII. Other Forms of Reasoning 


70 


VIII. The Thinking Process .... 


82 



©GU8568I© 



PREFACE 



The present chapters are intended to furnish to 
students of elementary psychology a study of the thinking 
process. Nearly all of the present day textbooks in 
psychology either omit entirely a study of the thinking 
process, or treat it very inadequately, on the ground that 
logic is a separate science. Whether it is a separate 
science or not, a knowledge of logical processes is an 
essential element in the preparation of a teacher; and 
since few normal schools offer a separate course in logic, 
whatever knowledge of logical processes is acquired must 
be obtained from the course in psychology. 

In the present chapters an attempt is made to bring 
the processes of the old formal logic into harmony with 
the most advanced development of functional and physio- 
logical psychology. That all mental functions are capable 
of reduction to such processes as will render a uniform 
treatment possible, is an article of faith with all psycholo- 
gists ; but up to the present, it has not seemed possible to 
give to the thinking processes a physiological and biologi- 
cal interpretation. 

Ypsilanti, January 2, 1910. 



CHAPTER I 

THE LAWS OF ASSOCIATION. 
So far "as association stands for a cause, it is between proceesses 

in the brain. — James,, Psychology, Volume I., p. 554. 

The socalled law of contiguity proves to be resolvable into the 
law of similarity. — Spencer, Psychology, Volume 2, p. 505. 

(In association) there is probably an increased closeness of 
connection between cell and cell which makes for a greater likeli- 
hood of recall for one when the other comes into consciousness. 
—Pillsbury, Attention, p. 105. 

Aristotle recalled the laws of this connection (association) to 
four, or rather three ; contiguity in time and space, resemblance, 
contrariety ; he even thought that they might all be carried up to 

One, coexistence. — Hamilton, Metaphysics, p. 424. 

These feelings (succession, similarity, coexistence) or their 
contraries are the foundation of everything that we call a relation. 
— Huxley's Hume, p. 81 . 

It had been assumed that when two groups of cells — the sub- 
stratum of two images — are excited at the same time, the nervous 
wave circulates -from one group to the other through those com- 
municating fibers that are so numerous in the brain. — Binet, Psy- 
chology of Reasoning, p.', 1 85. 

Contrast, however, is only a special case of similarity. Only, 
and in fact, just those ideas contrast that differ in one point while 
they are similar in very many other points.— Ziehen, Physiological 
Psychology, p. 207. 

The fundamental conception that all processes of thought can 
be reduced psychologically to the association of ideas will at all 

events endure. — Ziehen, Physiological Psychology, p. 244-5. 

On the contrary we shall hold to the fact that all these activities 
(understanding, reason, power of judgment, sagacity, fantasy, etc.) 
simply represent varieties of the association of ideas. It would not 
be at all difficult to reduce all these forms to the one fundamental 
form of association by purely psychological reasoning.— Ziehen, 
Physiological Psychology, p. 244-5. 



8 The Thinking Process 

So far from association by similarity being resolvable into con- 
tiguity, every association by contiguity on the contrary presupposes 
an association by similarity, or at least, immediate recognition. — 
Hoffding, Psychology, p. 1 57. 

From this point of view the association between part and 
whole would be the typical form of association. This fundamental 
law of all association of ideas might be called the law of totality.— 
Hoffding, p. 159. 

Contrasts often belong to the same general conception ; just 
as two poles are removed, each in its own direction, from a com- 
mon center. Dwarf and giant both deviate from the ordinary 
medium height. — Hoffding, p. 161 . 

Whence we see clearly that the ultimate law of association of 
feelings as above described has a definite physical counterpart, and 
there is no room for any other law of association of feelings.— 
Spencer, Psychology, Volume I, p, 258. 

What Association Is. — One idea succeeds another in 
the mind. It is impossible to retain one idea without 
variation for a longer time than about three-fifths of a 
second, and the whole series that follow one another is 
called a train of ideas, or a train of thought. 

If we write down the nine words that occur to the 
mind after a first one has been suggested, we shall have 
a train of ideas. Suppose the first word is watch. The 
following nine words, or ideas, that follow may be gold t 
mine, men, women, dress, pretty, witty, funny, pun. We 
shall need to answer the question why each word instead 
of some other follows the preceding. Gold follows watch 
because there is a distinct relation between watch and 
gold which we may call the relation of object and mate- 
rial. Gold is the material out of which a watch is fre- 
quently made. Mine follows gold because of the relation 
existing between them. Mine is the source from which 
the material comes, and the relation may be called material 
and source. Men follows upon mine in consequence of a 
similarity of sound. Women follows men, because of a 



Laws of Association 9 

relation of contrast. Also, we may notice that there is a 
similarity in sound in the final syllable of women. Dress 
is associated with women, and the relation is one that we 
may call contiguity. Pretty follows the word dress because 
of the fact that pretty is a quality of dress, The relation 
is one of substance and quality. Witty follows pretty, the 
relation being a similarity in sound. Funny is related 
to witty, there being a similarity in meaning. Pun 
follows funny, the relation being both one of similarity 
in meaning and in sound. 

Laws of Association.— We see, then, that there is a 
reason for the fact that each word follows the one that 
preceded it, and that reason is the existence of a relation 
between them. We have stated several relations, and 
there are many more. These relations are called Laws of 
Association. 

Older psychologists worked industriously to discover 
a complete list of the laws of association, and it was a 
very common occurrence for a psychologist to discover 
and formulate a new law. We see that to make a 
complete list of the laws of association is necessarily 
impossible, for there are just as many laws of association 
as there are relations that may exist between objects. 

Some of the Laws. — Some of the laws of association 
that psychologists discovered were the following: 
Contiguity, coexistence, contrast, cause and effect, 
similarity, part and whole, substance and quality, material 
and source. Many others might be mentioned, but these 
will sufficiently illustrate the matter. When many laws 
had been discovered, then psychologists undertook to 
reduce them to a smaller number, or to show that all of 
them were forms of a single law. Considerable success 
attended their efforts, and some psychologists believe that 



10 The Thinking Process 

the law of contiguity might be made to include all of them. 
The law of contiguity is a statement of the relation 
between two things that have existed, or do now 
exist, in the same place. The law of coexistence is a 
statement of the relation between two things that 
have existed at the same time. 

Others believe that the law of similarity would be 
sufficiently inclusive to cover all the relations, and still 
others that the law of part and whole, called the law of 
totality, might be sufficient. It does seem possible to 
reduce all laws of association to a single law, and it seems 
advisable to call that law the law of resemblance. 

Definition of Each. — The law of contiguity means that 
there is a relation between two objects or events that have 
existed in the same place, such that when we experience 
the idea of the one it is likely to be succeeded by the idea 
of the other. Rome, Tiber, Vatican are related by the 
law of contiguity. So two students who have graduated 
from the Normal college are thus related, although one 
may have been a student in 1865 and the other in 1909. 

The law of coexistence is a statement of the relation 
between two objects or circumstances that have 
occurred at the same time, such that when we experience 
the idea of the one it is likely to be succeeded by the idea 
of the other. The discovery of America and the invention 
of printing are two events thus related, for they occurred 
approximately at the same historical period. So two 
students of the Normal college who have attended school 
at the same time are related by the law of coexistence. 

The law of contrast is the statement of relation 
existing between two things that are different, such that 
when the idea of the one is experienced it is likely to be 
followed by the idea of the other. The idea of a tall man 



Laws of Association 11 

is likely to be followed by the idea of a short man. The 
idea of a cold day is likely to be followed by the idea of a 
warm one. 

The law of part and whole is a statement of the 
relation existing between the part and the whole, such 
that when the idea of the part is experienced it is likely to 
be followed by the idea of the whole, or the idea of the 
whole is likely to be followed by the idea of the part. 
Thus the idea of a particular window of a house is likely 
to be followed by the idea of the whole house, and the 
idea of the blade of a knife is likely to be followed by the 
idea of the knife itself. 

Reduction to the Law of Resemblance. — The law of 

contiguity may be reduced to the law of resemblance. 
Contiguity means that relation of existing in the same 
place, or contiguous portions of space. Two objects, 
events or circumstances that are related to each other by 
the law of contiguity resemble each other in the element 
of position, and there is the element of sameness of place 
in them. Two men who are students of the Normal 
College are botn alumni, or Normal College men, and 
they recognize a kinship with each other. Similarly the 
law of coexistence is a statement of the relation of 
resemblance, and two objects or events that coexist 
resemble each other in time. The resemblance is often 
much closer than this expression would suggest. Two 
students in the Normal College in the year 1909 resemble 
each other much more closely than does a student of 1909 
resemble one of 1865. Two present year students 
resemble each other in manners, dress, habits of fhought, 
subjects studied, topics of conversation, and in many 
other respects, much more closely than they resemble a 
student of 1865. 



12 The Thinking Process 

Reduction of the Law of Contrast.— It would seem 
that if we could reduce the law of contrast to a law of 
resemblance, we should be able to reduce every law to 
that form. But it is not difficult to show that two ideas 
of a contrasting pair are similar. The tall man is like the 
short man in the fact that both of them are different from 
the average man. But the resemblance goes deeper than 
this. They are both men. They belong to the same 
order of existence, and no contrast can exist between two 
things that belong to different orders of existence. There 
can be no contrast between the nominative case, and the 
horse power of an automobile. The law of part and 
whole is reducible to the law of resemblance. The part 
is like the whole, and the whole is like the part. A cupful 
of water is like the whole barrelful. The face of a watch 
is like the watch just in so far as it constitutes a part of 
the watch. 

Reduction of the Law of Cause and Effect.— The law 
of cause and effect will seem much more difficult to 
reduce to the law of resemblance. Can we show that the 
cause is like the effect and the effect is like the cause ? 
The difficulty comes from an indefiniteness in the meaning 
of cause. Philosophers are not at all agreed upon a 
definition, and until we have a satisfactory meaning for 
the word cause, we must expect to find difficulty in the 
management of the idea. But if we consider cause as 
being merely the force that is transmitted from the thing 
in which it exists to some other thing, whose change of 
position, movement or state is called the effect, we shall 
see that cause and effect are both forces, one of which is 
lost to the thing in which the cause exists and the other 
appears in the thing that manifests the effect. Force is 
the same, no matter in what form nor in what body it 
appears. Also, we might show that the law of cause and 



Laws of Association 13 

effect is one form of the law of contiguity, for the effect 
must always be contiguous to a cause, or have some kind 
of immediate contact with it. But the law of contiguity 
is one form of the law of resemblance, hence the law of 
cause and effect must also be. 

Mediate Reduction. — Sometimes it is necessary to 
reduce one of these laws to another and that other to the 
law of resemblance before we can show that all laws are 
capable of being thought of as forms of resemblance. It 
will be seen that the resemblance may exist in only one 
quality, and it is not necessary that all qualities shall be 
the same. If two things were to be the same in every 
respect, they would be identical, and instead of two, there 
would be only one. There can exist no relation then, 
without a difference. Resemblance depends upon and 
includes difference. 

Simultaneous Association.— The illustrations that we 
have employed are those of successive association, and 
the result is a train of ideas. But there is another kind of 
association that may be called simultaneous association, in 
which the associated processes occur in the same pulsation 
of consciousness, or in about three-fifths of a second. 
Such an association is illustrated by the process of 
perception, in which the various sensations that constitute 
the percept occur together, or nearly so. 

Exemplifies the Same Law. — A question may arise 
whether the qualities that exist in an apple and the 
sensations that enter into our percept or our idea of the 
apple are capable of being described in the same terms. 
Are the qualities of an apple or the sensations in our idea 
of the apple associated by the law of resemblance ? Do 



14 The Thinking Process 

the qualities of an apple and the sensations that occur in 
our percept or in our idea of an apple resemble each 
other ? 

Resemblance the Only Law in Perception.— The 

sensations that enter into our idea of an apple appear 
together, all of them being experienced in the same 
pulsation of consciousness. It is not difficult to show that 
they are associated by the law of resemblance. In the 
first place, they are associated by the law of contiguity, 
which is one form of resemblance, and they are associated 
by the law of coexistence, which is another form of 
resemblance. Also, no one of these qualities or sensations 
is incompatible with the others, so there is the element of 
compatibility; and besides this, sensations that are 
experienced together modify each other, so that each one 
affects every other. In this manner we may think of each 
of them being cause and effect in relation to the others. 
So it is not difficult for us to understand that the different 
sensations that enter into our idea or percept are 
associated by the law of resemblance as truly as are the 
elements in a train of ideas. 

Titchener's Formula. — Mr. Titchener describes a 
formula for association which represents the facts very 
nicely. He states it algebraically, thus : ab — be — cd—de — 
ef—fg — gh — e tc. Let ab be one idea consisting of several or 
many sensations, and be be another idea. A b is likely to 
be followed by the idea be, because be is like ab, both 
having the common element b, in which the resemblance 
consists. So be is likely to be followed by cd, because of 
the common element of resemblance c. 

Angell's Figure— Mr. Angell uses a different figure for 
association which is equally good. The figure consists of 



Laws of Association 15 

two circles which intersect, and so have a common section 
which represents the element of resemblance. Call one 
circle A and another circle B and call the section that is 
common to the two circles x. When the. idea which is 
represented by A is experienced it is likely to be followed 
by the idea B, because the idea B resembles the idea A in 
the common element x. The resemblance will be greater 
or less according as x is larger or smaller. 




A and B represent two combinations of neurons. X represents the 
neurons that are common to the two combinations. 



Physiological Interpretation of Association.— Let us try 

to think of these associations in physiological terms. We 
have already learned that when we are experiencing an 
idea, a nervous impulse is passing through some brain 
center. Let the circle A represent the brain center or 
combination of brain cells that is being traversed by an 
impulse when we are experiencing the mental process a, 
then the impulse passes out of the brain center A and into 
the brain center B which corresponds to the idea b. Now 
our question is why does the nervous impulse pass into B 
rather than into C or D or some other brain center ? The 
answer is evidently that there is less resistance between 
A and B than there is between A and C or any other 
brain center. The fact of little resistance is indicated by 
the common section x. When the nervous impulse is 



16 The Thinking Process 

traversing the center A, it is already traversing some of 
the brain cells which enter into the constitution of B; so 
in effect it is already in the center B when it is traversing 
A. 

Physiological Association Determined By Resistance.— 

It will be seen that the nervous impulse passes from the 
center in which it is at any time into that particular center 
that offers least resistance to its entrance. One idea will 
be followed by that idea which most closely resembles it, 
and we may recognize that the nervous impulse is directed 
by the resistance encountered. There is one modification 
of this rule which we must notice; that is that by a process 
of attention we may think of anything that we please, and 
are not compelled to depend upon accidental association. 
We may describe attention in physiological terms by 
saying that it is the process by which we may modify the 
resistance that a nervous impulse encounters, and so 
direct the nervous impulse into and through a brain 
center. This fact of attention must be taken into con- 
sideration in any discussion of association. 

Association Centers Not Necessarily Contiguous.— We 
have been discussing the brain centers and their close 
relation to each other as if the centers were contiguous, 
and that this contiguity constituted the closeness of the 
relation, but such is not necessarily the case. A combina- 
tion of cells in the occipital lobe may be more closely 
associated with a combination in the temporal lobe than 
it is with another combination in the occipital lobe. 
There are numerous bands of fibers, called association 
fibers, that connect different portions of the brain with 
each other. A nerve fiber offers little resistance to the 
transmission of an impulse, and when two portions of 
the brain are connected by means of fibers, they are 



Laws of Association 17 

much more intimately associated with each other than 
two other centers which are connected only through 
neurons, or brain cells, with their insulating neuroglia. 

Association Centers.— We have learned that the 
centers of sensation and of motion are pretty definitely 
localized in the brain. But when we have located as 
many areas of this kind as possible, we find that there 
are large portions of the brain in which no function is 
described. Four of these large areas, which we have 
recognized as unexplored areas, have been described 
by certain writers, provisionally at least, as the 
probable areas of the higher mental faculties. This 
implies that there are higher mental faculties than 
sensations and the association of ideas. Two of these 
areas are in the frontal lobes and two are in the 
parietal lobes. In them, various writers have located 
the functions of attention, memory, thought, appercep- 
tion. 

Flechsifs Investigations.— Flechsig has definitely 
located in these areas the function of association and 
has called them association centers. Haeckel has taken 
Flechsig's conclusions rather seriously, and has assumed 
that these really include thought centers, and has called 
this portion of the brain the thought portion, naming it 
the phronema. This seems to imply that there is a 
different portion of the brain involved in the experience 
of the idea of an apple from that which is traversed by an 
impulse when we perceive the apple. It implies that the 
functions of memory, reasoning, ideation, attention, and 
perhaps feeling, are located in particular places in the 
brain, and that there are higher processes of thought 
than those that are involved in the association. If we 
understand the process of association as we have inter- 



18 The Thinking Process 

preted it in physiological terms, we shall see that attention, 
memory, ideation, and thought are processes that cannot 
be localized in this way. It shall be our purpose to show 
that there are no higher processes of thought than 
those which are involved in these processes of associa- 
tion. Hence it appears that the assumption of Flechsig is 
entirely unnecessary, at least in the manner in which it is 
understood by Haeckel and others; and Flechsig himself 
has been compelled to modify his opinions very 
materially. We may not be able at present to determine 
what is the function of the unexplored areas, but there are 
many sensation areas that we have not as yet located. 

Effect of Attention Upon Association.— We have already 
made the statement that attention can vary the resis- 
tance and so modify association. When attention is 
wanting, as in the case of sleep, then the nervous impulse 
follows the path of least resistance, as it is determined 
without attention, and we sometimes remember things 
that we have forgotten in our waking hours. The fantas- 
tic character of dreams may be explained in this way, and 
sometimes oncoming disease has been recognized, which 
was not noticed in the waking hours. 

Imagination. — When ideas are associated, either by the 
process of attention or without it, that have not been 
associated in the original experience, we have the process 
of imagination. There is no brain center for imagination 
any more than there is for memory. Nervous impulses 
pass from one brain center that has been traversed before 
over into another that has been previously traversed, but 
over a different pathway from that by which the brain 
centers were entered in the original experience. If the 
attention is active and directing the impulse, we have 



Laws of Association 19 

the condition of active imagination; if the attention is 
wanting, we have the condition of passive imagination, 
or day dreaming. 



DEnSMITlONS 

Law of Association. — A law of association is a state- 
ment of the relation existing between two ideas that 
have been previously experienced, such that when one of 
them is again experienced, it is likely to be followed 
by the other. 

Train of Ideas. — The succession of ideas that are 
associated by successive association. 

Successive Association.— That kind of association in 
which ideas follow each other in successive pulsations 
of consciousness. 

Simultaneous Association. — That kind of association in 
which the associated elements occur in the same pulsation 
of consciousness. It is illustrated by the process of per- 
ception, in which the associated sensations are experienced 
at the same time. 

Relation. — In the most general meaning of the term it 
means any form of resemblance. It is the resemblance 
that one object or one idea bears to another object or to 
another idea. 

Phronema. — As used by Haeckel, it means that portion 
of the brain designated by Flechsig as association centers- 
It consists of four large unexplored areas, two in the 
frontal lobes and two in the parietal, in which no function 
has been definitely located by psychologists. 



CHAPTER II 



THE FORMATION OF THE GENERAL ABSTRACT NOTION. 

General notions are the shorthand of thought. — Thomdike, 
Psychology, p. 116. 

We cannot, in fact, assert the existence of an difference with- 
out at the same time implying the existence of an agreement. — 
Jettons, Principles of Science, p. 44. 

The end of philosophy is the detection of unity. — Hamilton, 
Metaphysics, p. 366. 

It may startle you to hear that the highest function of mind is 
nothing higher than comparison, but I am confident of convincing 
you of the paradox. — Hamilton, Metaphysics, p. 272. 

Since the process of reasoning is essentially a detection of 
similars, the great source of erroneous reasoning is the confusion 
of things that are not really and fundamentally similar ; or in other 
words, a want of discrimination. — Sully, Teacher's Handbook, P- 392. 

Coupled with discrimination, it (agreement) exhausts the 
meaning of what we call knowledge. — Bain, Mind and Body, p. 86. 

The common features do not suffice to constitute an image. 
Just as we cannot eat fruit in the abstract, but only apples, pears, 
etc., so we cannot picture fruit in the abstract. But then, have we 
psychologically, really general ideas ? — Holding, p. 1 66, 

It has been shown that comparison is the fundamental form of 
cognitive activity at all stages of development. But that which is 
tc be an object of comparison must be confronted with something 
else, either similar to it or different from it. — Hoffding, p. 216. 

The Intellectual Process.— The intellectual process, as 
distinguished from the affective or other process, is one 
which results in knowledge. It makes us know some- 
thing. A sensation makes us acquainted with the quality 
of an object. Perception is the process which makes us 
know an object, or the sum of all the qualities that we are 
able to discover in it. The percept is the sum of all the 



General Abstract Notion 21 

sensations that we receive from an object, both faint and 
vivid, as they modify each other. We may obtain several 
vivid sensations from an object, each of which is the 
concomitant of a peripherally initiated impulse, and there 
may be more than an equal number of faint sensations, 
each the concomitant of a centrally initiated impulse. All 
the sensations join themselves together, the concomitant 
impulses become a single one, the sensations modify each 
other, and the result is a percept. 

The Singular Concrete Notion.— We obtain by percep- 
tion, knowledge of a single individual thing, and this 
percept we may call a singular concrete notion, whose 
expression is a proper noun. A proper noun, then, is the 
expression of a singular concrete notion. Very few 
objects that we have occasion to indicate have proper 
names, so we do not many times indicate them correctly. 
We ordinarily employ a common name with limiting 
words to indicate which particular thing we refer to. 
Only persons, dogs, horses, and some other things are 
ordinarily called by their proper names. 

The General Abstract Notion. — A common noun is the 
expression of a general abstract notion. The general 
abstract notion, is the content or meaning of a common 
noun. The word concept is frequently employed to 
express what we shall understand by the term general 
abstract notion, but for our purpose the latter term is 
better. In order to understand how a general abstract 
notion is obtained we shall necessarily employ con- 
sciously a process which represents what actually occurs 
as an unconscious process in nearly every case. Let us 
suppose that we are intending to observe the process 
by which we obtain a general abstract notion of insect. 
We shall necessarily begin our study with an individual 



22 The Thinking Process 

insect, such as a grasshopper. The first thing we do is to 
look at the grasshopper as a whole, but this is not 
sufficient to give us a satisfactory knowledge of the 
grasshopper. Then we observe that the grasshopper is 
composed of parts, of which we readily discover, the 
head, thorax and abdomen. Now we fix our attention 
upon the head, to the exclusion, for the time being, of 
all other parts of the body. But we do not merely 
look at the head as a whole; we observe that it is 
made up of parts. We see the eyes, and fix our 
attention upon them, excluding for that instant all other 
parts of the head. We examine the antennae, fixing 
our attention for the instant upon one of them, excluding 
all other parts of the head. We count the segments of 
the antennae, and in the process of counting we are seeing 
just one segment of the antenna at a time, excluding all 
other segments and all other parts of the head. We count 
the segments, not for the purpose of finding out how 
many there are, although this knowledge will necessarily 
be obtained; but for the purpose of fixing our attention 
for the instant upon each single segment, to the exclusion 
of everything else. 

Abstraction. — While we are thus fixing our attention 
upon one thing to the exclusion of everything else, we are 
engaged in the process, of abstraction. Abstraction is a 
very important process, and really a very difficult one. 
Our grammars usually define an abstract noun as the name 
of some property or quality considered separate and apart 
from the object to which it belongs, but this usually gives 
a poor idea of the process. It is just as truly a process 
of abstraction to consider the leg of a grasshopper, or the 
second joint of the antennae, to the exclusion of all other 
segments, as it is to abstract truth, redness, virtue, or any 
other property from an object. 



General Abstract Notion 23 

Analysis. — The second process employed in the study 
of an object is analysis, which goes along parallel with 
that of abstraction, and in fact can scarcely be separated 
from it. Analysis differs from abstraction in the fact 
that it examines the relations that one part holds to the 
other parts. Our attention is focused, not upon the part 
itself, but upon the relation that this part holds to the 
other parts. We hear much of analysis in grammar and 
arithmetic, but the process is the same wherever we find 
it. In the analysis of the problems in arithmetic, we need 
to perceive the relation that one quantity in the problem 
holds to the other quantities. In the analysis of sentences 
in grammar we need to see the relation that one element 
in the sentence holds to the other elements. This process 
of abstraction and analysis is a necessary step in the 
formation of the general abstract notion, but it is all 
included in the study of the individual. The analysis that 
has been described may be called concrete analysis, for it 
is an analysis of an individual concrete thing. 

Related Knowledge.— After we have obtained as 
thorough a knowledge as possible of an individual insect, 
we proceed to study in the same way other related insects. 
It will require not nearly so long a time to study a cricket 
as it did a grasshopper, and we shall be able to see just as 
many things and see them just as well in two hours on 
the cricket as we did in twenty hours on the grass- 
hopper. This is not, however, because we have cultivated 
our observing powers, but because we have already a 
large body of knowledge by means of which we can tie 
up the new knowledge obtained in the study of the cricket. 
It is by means of this related knowledge that we are able 
to see so much more with the mind than we are with the 
eye. 



24 The Thinking Process 

Economy of Effort in Learning'.— The process by which 
the acquisition of related knowledge is made is a process 
of discrimination and comparison. In learning new 
knowledge that is related to the old, we do not examine 
every element of the new, but we examine and learn as 
new only those elements in which, the new differs from 
the old. The new elements may be a very small part of 
the old, and since in learning the new we have to learn 
only the elements that are different, we shall discover 
that there is a great economy of effort. If we suppose 
that there are ten elements in the old knowledge that we 
have learned, and that in the new which we wish to learn 
there are also ten, but only three of the ten elements are 
different, and seven are the same, we can see that it will 
require only three tenths as long to learn the new as it 
did the old. Hence it is wasteful expenditure of energy 
to learn anything as if it were unrelated to something 
else. 

Physiological Interpretation of Economy in Learning'. — 

This fact of economy in learning, and the process by 
which a new thing is learned by observing how it is like 
and how it differs from that which is already known, may 
be described in physiological terms. Let us suppose that 
the brain center A (fig. 1,) is the center that is traversed 
by one impulse when we experience the entire process of 
learning the first thing. Let us suppose that brain center 
B is the combination of cells that is traversed by impulses 
when we experience the new thing that is to be learned. 
Let us suppose that seven tenths of the cells in B are the 
same cells that are found in A, but that three tenths of B 
do not belong to A. The nervous impulse, having 
already traversed all the cells in brain center A will 
pass easily through that portion of B which is a part 
of A. The difficulty and resistance will be encountered 



General Abstract Notion 



25 



principally in that part or brain center B which is not 
found in A. Hence it is that the resemblance between 
A and B permits the impulse to pass readily through 
a large part of B. The effort of attention will 
then be devoted to driving the impulse through 
the portion of B which is not a part of A. The 
economy of effort in learning, then, depends upon the 
perception of the resemblance and the attention to the 
difference that the new thing bears to the old which we 
already know. 

Order of Study. — Let us suppose that we have studied 
a butterfly, beetle, bumblebee, squash bug, dragon fly, 
housefly and grasshopper. The order in which they are 
studied is not a matter of indifference. Certain relations 
make themselves manifest if they are studied in one order 
which do not appear, or which are much less easily seen 
if they are studied in a different order. When we have 
studied the individuals of these kinds then we are ready 
for the next step. We need to notice the differences 
which have manifested themselves to us while studying 
the different insects, and we make a table such as is here 
represented. This table represents the results of the 
process of discrimination. 

TABLE No. 1— DIFFERENCES OF INSECTS. 



Wings 

Mouth parts 

Metamorphosis 

Larva 

Pupa 



ORTHOP- 
TERA 

Grasshopper 



Straight 
Biting 

Direct 

Nymph 
Active 



LEPIDOP- 
TERA 

Butterfly 



Scaly 
Sucking 

Indirect 

Caterpillar 

Inactive 



HYMEN- 
OPTERA 

Bumblebee 



Membrane 
Biting and 
lapping 
Indirect 
Grub 
Inactive 



COLEOP- 
TERA 

Beetle 



Sheath 
Biting 

Indirect 

Grub 

Inactive 



HEMIP- 
TERA 

Squashbug 



Half 

Sucking & 
piercing 
Direct 
Nymph 
Active 



DIPTERA 
Housefly 



Two 
Sucking 

Indirect 
Maggot 
Inactive 



NEUROP- 
TERA 

Dragonfly 



Nerve 
Biting 

Direct 

Nymph 
Active 



26 The Thinking Process 

Discrimination. — By discrimination, we mean the per- 
ception of differences. It is an important process in 
thinking, and every great discovery that has ever been 
made has arisen from the recognition of finer and finer 
points of distinction. A good example of this is found in 
Lord Rayleigh's discovery of Argon. 

Discovery of Argon. — Lord Rayleigh undertook to dis- 
cover the exact weight of a given volume of nitrogen. He 
first obtained nitrogen by extracting from the air all the 
oxygen, water vapor, dust, carbon dioxide and everything 
else that the air contained except the nitrogen, and he 
ascertained the exact weight of a given volume of nitrogen 
so prepared. Then he obtained some nitrogen by liberat- 
ing it from its chemical compounds, and ascertained the 
exact weight of a given volume of nitrogen so obtained. 
The nitrogen obtained from the air weighed a very little 
more than that which was obtained from the chemical 
compounds. Repeating the processes merely showed 
that there was a constant difference, existing always in 
the same direction. 

The difference was not very great. Other chemists 
had weighed nitrogen, and had observed that nitrogen 
obtained from the air did not weigh exactly the same as 
did that which was obtained from chemical compounds ; 
but other chemists had regarded the differences as non- 
significant. They had accounted for it by supposing that 
they had made an error in the weighing ; or that their 
apparatus was slightly inaccurate; or that the amount 
was less than the limits of possible error. But Lord 
Rayleigh undertook to account for this minute difference, 
and as a result of the finer discrimination that he employed 
he discovered the presence of another element, which he 
called argon, and which constitutes about one per cent of 
the air. 



General Abstract Notion 27 

Effect of Discovery. — But his discoveries did not stop 
here. It led to the discovery of neon, krypton, xenon, 
other substances of the same group in the air, and the 
discovery of these substances made necessary a new 
column in the table of chemical elements. It seems now 
very possible that ether itself may ultimately be placed at 
the head of this column, the zero group of elements, and 
that we shall thus be furnished with a new and different 
explanation of some of the most important phenomena of 
the universe, if not a new hypothesis of the constitution 
of the universe itself. Such are the far reaching effects 
of making finer and finer discriminations. 

Table of Resemblances. — Another process must now be 
examined. While we have been studying these different 
animals and observing how they differ from each other, 
we have also been observing how they resemble each 
other. We see that they all have three body divisions, 
segmented abdomen, seventeen body segments, six legs, 
two pairs of wings, jointed appendages, breathe by spira- 
cles, all lay eggs, three thoracic segments, jaws move 
sideways, one pair of antennae, compound eyes, chitinous 
exoskeleton, double nerve cord and ganglia. We might 
also observe that they are composed of many cells, are 
bilaterally symmetrical, take solid food, exchange carbon 
dioxide for oxygen, sexes different, and many other things. 
However, table 2 will exhibit a sufficient number of resem- 

TABLE No. 2— RESEMBLANCES OF 
INSECTS 



Housefly 

Beetle 

Squashbug 

Butterfly 

Grasshopper 

Bumblebee 

Dragonfly 



Chitinous exoskeleton 

Three bodyCdivisions 

Seventeen body segments 

Segmented abdomen 

Jointed appendages 
< One pair of antennae 

Two pairs of maxillae 

Three pairs of legs 

Jaws move sideways 

Compound eyes 

Breathe by spiracles 
.Double nerve cord and ganglia 



28 The Thinking Process 

blances which we have observed to illustrate the process. 
All the animals that we have studied manifest these 
characteristics. They are alike in so many respects that 
we may group their likenesses together and designate 
their sum by a single word, insect. The use of the word 
insect is a labor saving device. No very elaborate thinking- 
could be carried on if we were compelled to state every 
time one by one the entire list of characters in the table 
that the word insect connotes. The word insect, then, 
expresses the entire sum of characters which is repre- 
sented by the table, or the general abstract notion. It is 
abstract because it expresses the characters which have 
been abstracted from the different individuals which we 
have studied. It is general, because these characters are 
all of them found in every individual which we have 
studied. 

Content of the General Abstract Notion.— -The general 
abstract notion is always derived from a table of resem- 
blances. In the case described, the table has been written 
out and the notion has been obtained in a formal and 
conscious way, but in nearly all cases in which we form a 
general abstract notion, the discrimination and comparison, 
and making of the table has been done in an unconscious 
and informal manner. It is generally not at all the con- 
scious process that we have described. We ordinarily 
obtain our notion by reading a word in many different 
connections, and the similarity of meaning in the different 
places in which we have used it or seen it used, constitutes 
for us the unconscious table of resemblances. We are 
generally quite unable to state distinctly the different 
characters that constitute the table and which make up 
for us the general abstract notion. But the process of 
comparison, is just as real, and the table of resemblances 
is just as truly made as if it had been written out in a 
formal way. 



General Abstract Notion 29 

Different Contents.— From this conception of the 
general abstract notion and the process of its formation, 
some very evident and important corollaries are derived. 
In the first place, no two persons are likely to have exactly 
the same general abstract notion which a given word 
expresses. Some persons may have a long table of 
resemblances, and others have a short table; but both 
tables will be expressed by the same word, and it will 
inevitably mean somewhat different things to different 
persons. Since it is generally true that children get hold 
of words before they do the meanings, teachers find it a 
large part of their difficulty to fill up the empty words of 
children with a content. Inadequate tables of resem- 
blances, which common nouns express, are the source of 
many of the ludicrous mistakes that children make when 
writing examination papers. They are ludicrous and 
funny only to persons who have a fuller content of the 
words. 

No General Abstract Object. — Another corollary is that 
the general abstract notion has no actual tangible repre- 
sentative. It is merely a collection of characters, and the 
word which expresses that table of characters will apply 
to any individual that manifests those characters. But 
any individual which manifests those characters will also 
manifest other characters which make it an individual 
and which will discriminate it from other individuals. 

Abstract Notion Not An Image.— The fact that certain 
persons habitually think in visual images has led many 
psychologists to consider the general abstract notion, or 
concept, as an image. The word concept is in a large 
measure responsible for this error, and is often regarded 
as an image. But auditory minded persons do not have a 
visual image, and those persons who have most occasion 



30 The Thinking Process 

to deal in a scientific manner with general abstract no- 
tions, are most completely lacking in them. The botanist 
or zoologist who classifies his individual objects, does it 
often, without ever having seen or heard of a specimen of 
the class to which he assigns his individual. His notion 
of the family or genus is altogether a printed or written 
description, which states merely the sum of characters, 
and from this he classifies his individual. Just as the 
person who has a complex number form is unable to 
understand how one who has no number form can 
possibly handle numbers, so the visual minded person is 
unable to understand how a concept or general abstract 
notion can be anything but a visual image. The 
sum of the common characters is the general abstract 
notion, while the sum of the common characters plus 
the individual characters is the singular concrete notion. 
Hence there are no general abstract objects, but only 
singular concrete objects. 

Not Derived From a Single Thing.— Another corollary 
follows. We can never obtain a general abstract notion 
from a single thing. When there was only one war 
vessel called the Monitor, our notion of monitor was a 
single concrete notion. But when other vessels of the 
same type were constructed, then our notion of monitor 
became a general abstract. 

Comparison. — The process of perceiving resemblances 
is called comparison. It is of equal importance with the 
process of discrimination. The two processes may exist 
in different degrees in the same person, although both 
are of importance. The person who perceives resem- 
blances is the person who is able to become a philosopher, 
and to discover the element of identity in diverse 
phenomena. 



General Abstract Notion 31 

The Only Process of Learning.— The two processes of 
discrimination and comparison lie at the foundation of all 
processes of learning. There is no way of learning any- 
thing except by discovering how it is like or how it differs 
from something else. This is merely another way of 
saying that all knowledge is relative, and that nothing 
exists out of relation. Knowledge begins when we ob- 
serve differences and resemblances. 

Resimilation. — As we were able to reduce all laws of 
association, even the law of contrast, to the law of 
resemblance, and so define all relation as resemblance, so 
it is possible to show that the processes of discrimination 
and comparison are merely different aspects of the same 
process. It is impossible to perceive difference without 
at the same time discovering resemblance. We may call 
this one process the perception of resemblance, but in 
order to avoid the use of the word perception in the 
expression perception of resemblance, as well as to avoid 
adopting one of the two processes which we have de- 
scribed to the exclusion of the other, we may better coin 
a new word. Let us use the word resimilation, to mean 
perception of resemblance. 

Physiological Interpretation of Resimilation.— It is diffi- 
cult to understand how discrimination and comparison 
may be reduced to the same process, unless we image it 
in physiological terms. Let the circle which represents 
the brain center A have seven tenths of its cells common 
with brain center B. The element of resemblance will 
be represented by the common section x, and the element 
of difference by the other portions of the two circles. 
When a nervous impulse passes through the circle A and 
from there into the circle B, the transmission of the im- 
pulse through the common section will be the concomitant 



32 The Thinking Process 

of the perception of resemblance, and there will be 
feeling of similarity. But in the transmission of the 
impulse through the two brain centers, the impulse w\\l 
pass through the portions of the two centers that are not 
common and the concomitant feeling will be a feeling of 
difference. Hence the physiological concomitant of the 
process of discrimination is the transmission of the impulse 
through the non-common cells, and the physiological 
concomitant of the process of comparison will be the 
transmission through the common cells. Since in the 
process of transmission through both centers both the 
common and the non-common cells are traversed, we 
shall see that both processes have their concomitants in 
the single process of the transmission of the impulse 
through the entire group of cells. The transmission is 
a single physiological process, and the process of re- 
similation is its single psychological concomitant. 

DEFINITIONS 

General Abstract Notion. — A general abstract notion is 
the sum of all the characters that are common to a series 
of objects. 

Common Noun. — The expression of a general abstract 
notion. 

Singular Concrete Notion.— A percept; or the sum of 
all the sensations that we obtain from an object. Each 
sensation in us corresponds to a quality in the object. 

Proper Noun. — The expression of a singular concrete 
notion. 

Abstraction. — The process of examining or attending 
to a single part or property of an object to the exclusion 
of the other parts. 



General Abstract Notion 33 

Analysis.— The process of examining a part or quality 
of an object in its relations to other parts or qualities. 

Discrimination— The process of perceiving differences. 

Comparison. — The process of perceiving resemblances. 

Generalization. — The entire process involved in forming 
a general abstract notion. It includes abstraction, analysis, 
discrimination, comparison. The process results not 
merely in the formation of a general abstract notion, but 
also in the discovery of a law, or the statement of a 
principle. 

Resimilation. — The perception of resemblance. The 
word resemblance is here used to include also difference, 
as indicated before. The entire process of discovering 
likeness and difference. 



CHAPTER HI 



PROPERTIES OF THE GENERAL ABSTRACT NOTION 

Origin of the Notion.— The general abstract notion is 
the sum of all the resemblances which we have discovered 
in the objects studied. The common noun which expresses 
it has its meaning for us in that table of resemblances. 
When we have said insect, we have said everything that 
is included in table 2. In only a very few cases is such a 
table consciously prepared, but every common noun is 
obtained from a table that is just as real as if it were 
consciously written out. Every general abstract notion is 
derived from such a table. 

Logical Definition. — This, however, does not enable us 
to make a definition. We may say that a beetle is an 
insect — , but if we stop here we have not made a defini- 
tion. We have said a great deal; we have said everything 
that is included in the table of resemblances, but we have 
not defined beetle. A grasshopper is an insect, and so is 
a bumblebee, from which we have not discriminated 
beetle. We may make such a discrimination by inserting 
in our definition the characters in the table of differences 
in the column under beetle. Then we shall have a defini- 
tion of the following form : A beetle is an insect that has 
sheath wings, biting mouthparts, and indirect metamor- 
phosis. 

Parts of the Definition.— It will be seen that this 
definition contains two parts; first the name of the 
comprehensive group, which is derived from the table 
of resemblances, and second, the differences that dis- 
tinguish the thing we are defining from other members 



General Abstract Notion 



35 



of the same group. The first is a general abstract 
notion derived from a table of resemblances, and is called 
the genus. The second element of the difinition consists 
of the characters found in the table of differences, and are 
called the differentia. No definition can be satisfactory 
that does not include both of these elements. Such a 
definition is called a logical definition, and it expresses 
the nature of the thing defined. Most of our dictionary 
definitions are not logical definitions, but statements of 
descriptive characteristics by means of which we may be 
able to identify the thing described. When I say that 
Mr. Laird's house is 318 Forest Avenue, I have not made 
a definition of Mr. Laird's house, but merely stated one 
characteristic by means of which it may be identified. 

Notion of Arthropod. — We have now arrived at a 
general abstract notion of insect and by a similar process 
we may reach a general abstract notion of arthropod. If 
we study a spider, centipede and crawfish we shall see 
that they have characters in common with the grass- 
hopper, but that the number is not so large as that which 
exists between the insects previously studied. Let us 
examine tables 3 and 4. 

TABLE No. 3.— DIFFERENCES OF ARTHROPODS. 



INSECTA 
Grasshopper 



ARACHNIDA 
Spider 



MYRIAPODA 
Centipede 



CRUSTACEA 

Crawfish 



Body divisions- 
Skeleton 

Antennae 

Eyes 

Breathing 

Number of legs. 



Three 

Chitinous 
One pair 
Compound 
Spiracles 
Three pairs 



Two 

Chitinous 
None 
Simple 
Air gills 
Four pairs 



One (differen- 
tiated) 
Chitinous 
One pair 
None 
Spiracles 
31 pairs 



Two 

Calcareous 
Two pairs 
Compound 
Gills 
Ten 



The Thinking Process 

TABLE No. 4— RESEMBLANCES OF 
ARTHROPODS 



Grasshopper 
Spider 
Centipede 
Crawfish 



' Exoskeleton 
Jointed appendages 
White blood 
Jaws move sideways 
Double nerve cord and ganglia 
Specialized breathing organs 



From table 4 we are able to arrive at a general 
abstract notion of arthropod, and from table 3 we are able 
to make a logical definition of insect. We may define an 
insect as an Arthropod which has a chitinous exoskeleton, 
two pairs of wings, one pair of antennae, seventeen body 
segments, compound eyes, three body divisions, breathes 
by spiracles. 

Different Ranks.— It will be seen from this that the 
notion arthropod is not of the same rank as is the notion 
insect. Arthropod includes all the individuals that are 
included in the notion insect, but there are many 
arthropods that are not insects. Some arthropods are 
spiders and others are centipedes. General abstract 
notions are of different ranks. 

Scientific Notions. — Zoologists and botanists, whose 
subjects better illustrate the process of making a general 
abstract notion than any others, and who have been 
compelled to study the process by which it is made, have 
devised a convenient method of expressing this fact. 
The general plan is as follows : Individuals that are 
alike, as nearly alike as parent and offspring, make up a 
species. Species that are alike make up a genus. Genera 
that are alike constitute a family. Families that are alike 
make an order. Orders that are alike constitute a class. 
Classes that are alike make up a branch, and branches 
that are alike make up a kingdom. Individual, species, 
genus, family, order, class, branch, kingdom are the names 
of different ranks of general abstract notions that 



General Abstract Notion 37 

botanists and zoologists have adopted. There are many 
subdivisions and other ranks, but these eight rankings 
are universally recognized. In some books on zoology 
there are employed as many as twenty one different 
rankings of general abstract notions. 

Rank Depends Upon Degree of Resemblance.— We 

have said that notions that are alike, which contain the 
same characters, constitute the notion of the next higher 
rank. It will be seen at once that the essential process 
in making each notion is the perception of resemblance, 
and that the degree of resemblance, as represented by 
the number of characters, varies with the notions of 
different ranks. 

Genus. — We have used the term genus, in our 
description of the process of making a logical definition. 
It will be seen that the word means something different 
from what it does when we speak of genus as one of the 
distinctions of rank of general abstract notions. As we 
use the term in making a logical definition, it means any 
comprehensive group that is composed of groups or 
notions of a lower rank. When we speak of genus as one 
of the ranks of general abstract notions, we mean a rank 
of a particular degree of complexity. In making a logical 
definition, we must use as our genus the name of a 
comprehensive group that shall include the one we are 
defining. Since there may be several groups of different 
ranks that will include the one we are defining, it is 
necessary to know which group we ought to employ. 
Thus in making our definition of insect we may use for 
our genus either arthropod or animal, since both of them 
are general abstract notions that include insect; but we 
should always use the notion of the next higher degree of 
complexity, or as logicians express it, the proximum genus. 



38 The Thinking Process 

Coordinate Ranks.— Of course it will be understood 
that kingdom, class, order and so on are names of ranks, 
not names of notions. There may be several notions, co- 
ordinate with each other and all having the same rank. 
Thus in the rank of kingdom, there are three general 
abstract notions, the animal, mineral and vegetable king- 
doms. So zoologists describe eight different branches of 
the animal kingdom, all coordinate with each other, but 
each notion designated by a different name and composed 
of a different group of characteristics. 

Comparison of Tables.— If we examine tables three 
and four, we shall see that table four is a shorter table 
than is table two. Also we shall see that all the characters 
found in table four exist in table 2, and that the characters 
in table 2 which are not found in table 4 are found in 
table 3. Table 2 has been split up into a table of 
differences and a table of resemblances. 

Comprehension. — As our notion of higher rank is 
formed, the table of resemblances becomes shorter and 
shorter, and the number of resemblances among the 
individuals that have been examined become fewer. This 
fact is expressed by saying that the comprehension of the 
notion is less. Comprehension is that property of the 
notion which refers to the number of characters that 
make it up. The greater the number of characters, the 
greater the comprehension. The table of resemblances 
which constitutes the notion of insect is longer than that 
which constitutes the notion arthropod, and the notion 
insect is said to have greater comprehension than the 
notion arthropod. 

Extension.— But at the same time that the table of 
characters has been growing shorter, the number of 
individuals that manifest those characters has become 



General Abstract Notion 39 

greater. There are more arthropods than there are 
insects. This property of the notion is expressed by 
saying that the extension of the notion has been 
increased. Extension is that property of the notion that 
refers to the number of individuals which manifest the 
characters constituting the notion. In general we may 
say that extension and comprehension are reciprocally 
related to each other. The greater the extension the less 
the comprehension, and the less the extension the greater 
the comprehension. 

Summum Genus. — We cannot define beetle until we 
have a notion of insect. We cannot define arthropod 
until we have a notion of animal, and we cannot define 
animal until we have a notion that is extensive enough to 
include animal and plant. We must always have a notion 
of sufficiently high rank to include as a species the notion 
that we are defining. So in order to define animal we 
must have a notion, such as organic being, that would 
include animals and plants. In order to define organic 
being we must have a notion that will include organic 
being and inorganic being. This notion may be called 
simply being. But we cannot define being until we shall 
have a notion sufficiently extensive to include both being 
and not-being, and what we may call this notion no one 
can say. The summum genus, in the words of the old 
logicians, cannot be defined. But it is upon this concep- 
tion, that being and not being are identical, that Hegel, 
the great philosopher, founded his whole system. 

Other Abstract Notions.— We have been using illus- 
trations that lead to the formation of the general abstract 
notion expressed by a common noun; but it must be 
evident that it is the same process that leads us to the 
meaning of any notion, no matter what part of speech 



40 The Thinking Process 

expresses it. The notion expressed by a verb is as truly 
a general abstract notion as is that expressed by a 
common noun, and so is the notion expressed by an 
adjective or a preposition. Nearly all of our common 
words are of this kind. The only real things are the 
particular individuals that we perceive. We may define 
some of our most difficult words as expressions of general 
abstract notions. Thus life may be defined as the general 
abstract notion which is composed of the characters that 
are common to all living things. Mind is the general 
abstract notion composed of all the characters that are 
common to all mental processes. Character is the general 
abstract notion consisting of all the qualities common to 
the actions of a person. These are helpful and necessary 
processes of thinking, but we lead ourselves into error if 
we consider them as real existing entities and make of 
them causes. 

Generalization. — So far we have been discussing the 
formation of the general abstract notion, and have 
described the process in detail. The entire process may 
be called generalization, and leads not merely to the 
formation of a general abstract notion, but when applied 
to other processes, it may result in the formation of a law 
or the statement of a principle. The essential element in 
the process is resimilation, which is illustrated in our 
physiological figure by supposing that the same cells are 
traversed in the course of the transmission of a nervous 
impulse through two different brain centers. 

DEFINITIONS 

Logical Definition. — A logical definition is a statement 
that manifests the nature of the thing defined. It always 
includes two elements, the genus and the differentia. 



General Abstract Notion 41 

Genus. — Genus is the name of the comprehensive 
group to which the thing we are defining belongs. It is 
always a general abstract notion. 

Differentia. — Differentia are the differences or 
characters which separate the thing we are defining from 
other members of the same group. 

Extension. — Extension is that property of the general 
abstract notion that refers to the number of individuals 
included under the notion, or to the number of individuals 
that manifest the characters that constitute the notion. 

Comprehension. — Comprehension is that property of 
the general abstract notion that refers to the number of 
characters that constitute the notion. 



CHAPTER IV 



JUDGMENT 

The association of ideas in the case of judgment is almost 
without exception an intimate association of simultaneous ideas, 
and an association in which conceptions of relation are of special 
importance. Of all possible associations, a judgment is just that 
select association in which no contradictory ideas occur. — Ziehen, 
'Physiological 'Psychology, p. 228. 

Every proposition expresses resemblance or difference of the 
things denoted by its terms.— Jeoons, 'Principles of Science, p. 24. 

. A similar interpretation of the relation leads Binet to assert 
that all perception is judgmont. Both of these terms serve merely 
to point out the similarities of the perception process to the more 
complicated mental processes, and in so far we may accept them.— 
Pillsbuiy, Attention, p. 118. 

Judgment is the mental assertion of the degree of relationship 
arrived at in some one stage of the process of conception. — Baldwin, 
Handbook, Vol. I, p. 283. 

Meaning' of Judgment.— The word judgment is used 
with a greater variety of incompatible meanings than is 
any other word in psychology. It is employed to mean 
discrimination, belief, perception, analysis, distribution of 
sensational elements, the fundamental element in eyery 
intellectual process, and perhaps several other meanings. 
At the same time, different users of the word seem to 
believe that they are talking about the same thing, each 
claiming that his use of the word is the true meaning. 
Hence it is impossible to use the word at all without a 
careful definition of what is meant by it. 

By judgment, in this book, we shall mean the move- 
ment of thought involved in perceiving the resemblance 
between two notions. This is the common meaning 
employed by writers on logic, and it is both logical and 



Judgment 43 

psychological. That there is a possibility of comparing 
two notions will be denied by no one, and that a psycho- 
logical process is employed in making the comparison is 
equally evident. It is that psychological process which is 
employed here as the content of the word judgment. 

Process of Judging*. — In judging we hold in mind two 
notions and decide that they agree or disagree. Thus we 
may hold in mind the notion of snow and the notion of 
whiteness and we decide that they agree. We hold in 
mind the notion of insect and the notion of vertebrate, 
and we decide that an insect is not a vertebrate. In every 
case we decide upon the agreement or disagreement; we 
discover a resemblance or a difference. We express the 
judgment by is or is not. Such a judgment is called a 
qualitative judgment, and there are two varieties. The 
judgment of agreement is called the affirmative, and the 
judgment of disagreement is called the negative judgment. 

Two Kinds of Judgment.— In our study of the laws of 
association we learned that it was possible to reduce the 
law of contrast to the law of resemblance and that we 
might use the term resemblance in a sense broad enough 
to include the element of difference. Similarly it is 
possible to discover that every judgment consists in the 
perception of resemblance between two notions. How- 
ever, it will be convenient for us to retain the distinction 
between negative and affirmative judgments. 

Judgment A Resimilation— We have learned that in a 
percept we perceive the resemblance between the qualities 
of an object, and that the percept is really the sum of 
sensations associated by the law of coexistence and con- 
tiguity. In forming a general abstract notion, we perceive 
the resemblance between two or more singular concrete 
notions. In making a judgment we perceive the resem- 



44 The Thinking Process 

blance between two general abstract notions, although it 
is not necessary that the notions shall both of them be 
abstract. The similarity between perception, forming a 
general abstract notion, and judgment, is that in all of 
them there is the same process of the perception of 
resemblance. The difference exists in the things between 
which the resemblance is perceived. 

Physiological Interpretation of Judgment.— The same 
figure may be employed to express the physiological 
process of the perception of resemblance that we have 
already described in the process of forming the general 
abstract notion. Two circles having a common section x 
may represent the two combinations of cells that are 
traversed by impulses when we experience the two 
general abstract notions whose resemblance is perceived. 
The nervous impulse passes directly from one brain center 
to the other by means of the common section when we 
make a judgment of agreement. Even if the judgment 
be one of disagreement, we shall find that the same 
figure will illustrate it. 

Propositions. — The expression of a judgment is a 
proposition. Every proposition contains three elements 
which correspond to the three elements in a judgment. 
The three elements of the proposition are the subject, 
predicate and the copula. In every judgment we shall 
find that there are two notions and the judgment itself. 
The two notions, however, are not of the same rank in 
the judgment, and perform different functions. One of 
the notions is a standard of comparison, and the other 
notion is brought up beside it to be compared with the 
standard. The expression of the notion that is the 
standard of comparison is the predicate of the proposition 
and the expression of the notion that is compared to the 
standard is the subject. The copula is the expression of 
the judgment itself. 



Judgment 45 

Varieties of Judgment. — In general it is true that the 
extension of the notion which is expressed by the predi- 
cate is greater than the extension of the subject notion. 
But the comprehension of the subject is greater than the 
comprehension of the predicate. Since we have defined 
the notion as the sum of characters, it appears that it is 
necessary for us to indicate the difference between the 
two notions by making the circle which will represent the 
cells traversed by an impulse when we experience the 
subject notion larger than that which expresses the predi- 
cate notion. Also, it will seem that in many cases of a 
judgment of agreement it will be necessary to include the 
predicate notion wholly within the circle represented by 
the subject notion. If the agreement is complete, as may 
be expressed by such propositions as six is six; or once 
one is one; or pigs is pigs, then we may express the fact 
by making the two circles coincide. Such judgments are 
called identities. Nearly all judgments, however, are 
perceptions of agreement in merely certain respects, or 
partial identities. A judgment of disagreement is one in 
which the particular element in the notion that is com- 
pared is not found in the other. It must be represented 
by two circles, each indicating a combination of brain cells, 
some of which are common to the two centers, but the 
particular cells that correspond to the element in the one 
that is compared with the other does not belong to the 
common section. If the two combinations were entirely 
different, the process would not be an act of judgment 
but one of reasoning. 

Another Interpretation of Judgment.— There is another 
opinion concerning the nature of judgment which is so 
well known that it must be described in this place. That 
opinion is that judgment is not a process of comparing 
separate notions, but is setting apart and separating from 



46 The Thinking Process 

each other the elements that enter into a single notion. 
The notion as it is first obtained consists of an un- 
differentiated whole. The process of judging consists in 
separating this undifferentiated whole into its elements 
and recognizing them as separate parts. 

A Criticism. — This idea is a very old one. It was that 
adopted by Crousaz as far back as 1724, and although it 
has the approval of some of our best psychologists, it 
cannot be made to conform to the process by which a 
notion is built up in the mind of a child. The percept of 
an apple that a child gets is obtained part at a time. In 
case of a little child the senses do not all become 
functional at once, and when two or more sensations are 
experienced at the same time, no perception occurs until 
these sensations are associated by the law of resemblance. 
So when we see an object of complex combination, not all 
the sensations will be experienced the first time that 
correspond to the different qualities. A peripherally 
initiated impulse that is established by one part of the 
object will not be transmitted through its appropriate 
brain center, unless the impulse becomes very strong, or 
unless the same center has been traversed before. Hence 
it is that although we may look at a complex object, such 
as a landscape, we fail to experience all the sensations 
that we shall ultimately obtain. The process of obtaining 
a more adequate perception of the complex object is not a 
process of analysis and separation, but a process of accre- 
tion and association. 

Judgment As The Fundamental Process.— The term 
judgment is also employed to designate the fundamental 
process that is common to all intellectual operations, and 
the attempt is made to identify it with the process pre- 
viously described. It is the purpose of this book to show 



Judgment 47 

that all intellectual processes have a common element, and 
that different intellectual processes differ principally from 
each other in degree of complexity. The writer 
believes that the fundamental process can best be 
described by calling it resimilation, or the perception of 
resemblance, and that to call it judgment is a very un- 
fortunate designation. 

Four Kinds of Propositions. — The distinction between 
positive and negative judgments is called a qualitative 
difference. But we may have judgments that apply to 
all the particulars, or universal judgments, and those that 
apply to only some, or particular judgments. This is a 
distinction in quantity. Each kind of judgment, and 
consequently each proposition, may be distinguished 
according to both its quality and quantity. Hence we can 
discover that there are four kinds of propositions; univer- 
sal affirmative, universal negative, particular affirmative, 
particular negative. These kinds of propositions may be 
illustrated as follows : 

Universal affirmative — All grasshoppers have six legs. 

Universal negative — No grasshopper has six legs. 

Particular affirmative — Some grasshoppers have six 
legs. 

Particular negative — Some grasshoppers do not have 
six legs. 

Although in the proposition, all" insects have six legs, 
legs is not the grammatical predicate, but the object of 
have, it is the psychological predicate, and the word have 
expresses the agreement of the two notions even better 
than the copula is. To say that an insect has six legs 
implies that the character of six leggedness is one of the 
group of characters in the table of resemblances which 
constitutes the general abstract notion of insect. 



48 



The Thinking Process 



Symbolic Propositions.— The four kinds of propositions 
are expressed in a shorthand manner by the letters A E I 
O. A expresses the universal affirmative, E is the uni- 
versal negative, I is the particular affirmative, and is 
the particular negative. 

Diagram of Relations.— There is an old diagram which 
is employed to express the relations that these proposi- 
tions bear to each other. The diagram is a square with 
two diagonals. At the upper left hand corner of the 
square, is placed the letter A. At the upper right hand 
corner, E; at the lower left hand corner I, and at the lower 
right hand corner the letter 0. 

If we examine the four propositions that we have 
employed to illustrate the different kinds of judgments, 
we shall see that certain relation exist which are necessary 
and inevitable. Thus if A (all grasshoppers have six legs) 
is true, E (no grasshopper has six legs) cannot be true. 
If A is not true, E may or may not be true, and we do not 
know which it is. It is unknown. If E is true, A cannot 
be true, but if E is untrue, A may or may not be true, and 




Diagram of relations between symbolic propositions. 



Judgment 49 

we can tell nothing about it. E and A cannot both be 
true at the same time, but both of them may be untrue. 
This relation is called the relation of contrary. 

Relations o! Propositions.— Similarly, if I is true, (some 
grasshoppers have six legs) 0, (some grasshoppers do not 
have six legs) may or may not be true. We cannot tell 
which it is, for we know nothing about from the fact 
that I is true. If 1 is untrue, we know that must be 
true. If is true, we know nothing about it; it may or 
may not be true. If is untrue, I must be true. Both of 
them cannot be untrue at the same time. This differs 
from the relation between E and A, and is called the rela- 
tion of sub-contrary. 

If A is true, I must be true ; if A is untrue, I may or 
may not be true, and we cannot tell which it is. If I is 
true, we know nothing about A, but if I is untrue, A must 
necessarily be untrue also. This relation is called the 
relation of subaltern, and the same relation exists between 
E and 0. 

Contradictories. — The most important relation is that 
which exists between A and 0. If A is true (all grass- 
hoppers have six legs), then (some grasshoppers do not 
have six legs) is necessarily untrue. If A is untrue, then 
must of necessity be true. If O is true, A cannot be 
true, and if is untrue, then A must be true. Both can- 
not be true or untrue at the same time. If either one of 
them is true, the other must be untrue, and if either one 
is untrue, the other must be true. The relation is called 
contradictory, and of two contradictory propositions one 
must be true and the other must be untrue. It is this rule 
that is employed in geometry in making an indirect dem- 
onstration. The theorem that "If two planes are perpen- 
dicular to the same straight line they are parallel, is proved 



50 The Thinking Process 

by assuming that they are not parallel, and showing that 
this supposition is not true. Then the contradictory pro- 
position must be true, and the planes must be parallel. 



DEFINITIONS 

Judgment. — Judgment is the perception of agreement 
or disagreement between two notions. 

Affirmative Judgment.— Affirmative judgment is the 
perception of agreement between two notions. 

Negative Judgment. — Negative judgment is the percep- 
tion of the disagreement between two notions. 

Proposition. — A proposition is the expression of a 
judgment. 

Predicate. — The predicate is the expression of the 
notion that is used as the standard of comparison. 

Subject. — The subject is the expression of the notion 
that is compared with the predicate notion. 

Copula. — The copula is the expression of the judgment 
itself. 

Universal Judgment. — A universal judgment is a judg- 
ment of agreement or disagreement throughout the entire 
extension of the notions compared. It is indicated by all 
or no. 

Particular Judgment.— A particular judgment is a judg- 
ment of agreement or disagreement throughout only part 
of the extension of the notions compared. It is indicated 
by the word some, or its equivalent. 



CHAPTER V 

THE SYLLOGISM 

I call in question any method of reasoning which can be 
carried on without a knowledge of deductive processes.— Jeoons, 
Principles of Science, p. 12. 

Every conclusion (syllogistic) like every judgment, is merely 
an association of ideas. But as a distinct form of association it is 
almost of no importance psychologically. — Ziehen, Physiological 
Psychology, p. 229. 

Reasoning is a classification of relations. But what does clas- 
sification mean ? It means the grouping together of those that are 
alike. — Spencer, Psychology, Volume II, p. 115. 

The Syllogism. — We purpose to begin our study of 
reasoning with the syllogism, because it is the simplest 
and the best understood process. The laws of the syllo- 
gism were developed by Aristotle, who died 322 B. C, 
and there has been little improvement made in them since 
his time. Even if we can show that there are other forms 
of reasoning, or that syllogistic reasoning is capable of 
being reduced to other forms, it is still true that we must 
know what a syllogism is, and the kind of study that has 
been put upon it. 

Definition and Example.— A syllogism consists of a 
series of three propositions, two of which are so related 
to each other that the third one can be derived from 
them. 

The classical syllogism employed by Aristotle and 
repeated by every writer on logic since his time is as 
follows : 

All men are mortal. 
Socrates is a man. 
Socrates is mortal. 



52 The Thinking Process 

Instead of using this form in which one of the notions 
is a singular concrete notion, I should prefer to employ 
our old friend the grasshopper as the subject of the 
propositions, and use two general abstract notions. Let 
us examine the following syllogism. 

All insects have six legs. 
The grasshopper is an insect. 
The grasshopper has six legs. 



Parts of a Syllogism.—-In this series the third proposi- 
tion is called the conclusion, because it is derived from 
the other two. The other two are called the premises, 
the first of which is the major premise and the second is 
the minor. It will be seen that the two premises contain 
two general abstract notions each, but an examination of 
the notions involved will show that there is one notion, 
insect, that is found in both of the premises. Instead of 
being four notions, there are only three. The notion 
that is found in both premises, expressed by the term 
insect, is called the middle term, and is designated by the 
capital letter M. 

Meaning of the Terms.— The major premise contains 
the middle term, and another which is called the major 
term. The major term is designated by the letter P, be- 
cause it is used as the predicate of the conclusion. The 
minor premise contains besides the middle term another 
which is called the minor. It is designated by the letter S, 
because it is used as the subject of the conclusion. The 
major premise is called the major premise because it con- 
tains the major term, and the minor premise is called minor 
because it contains the minor term. The major term is 
called major because, like the predicate of any other 
proposition, it has greater extension than the minor term. 



The Syllogism 53 

Syllogism A Process of Comparison.— In perception, we 
perceive resemblances between the qualities of an object. 
In forming a general abstract notion we perceive resem- 
blances between singular concrete notions. In making a 
judgment we perceive resemblances between general 
abstract notions, although it is not necessary that both 
notions shall be abstract. In a syllogism, we have a more 
complex process, and it appears that we ought to say that 
we compare judgments, although in fact such is not the 
case. We compare notions in a syllogism just as we do 
in making a judgment, with this difference, however, that 
in a judgment, we compare two notions directly with each 
other, while in a syllogism we compare two notions 
indirectly by means of a third which is expressed by the 
middle term. We perceive resemblance between two 
notions in both judgment and in a syllogism, but in one 
case we perceive it by a process of direct comparison, 
while in the other, we perceive it by a process of indirect 
comparison. 

Axiom. — There is an axiom in mathematics which with 
a slight change of meaning will apply here. Things that 
are equal to the same thing are equal to each other. So 
we may say that notions that are similar to the same notion 
are similar to each other. The paraphrase is not strictly 
true, for the similarity to the same notion may exist in 
different qualities in notions that are compared with it. 

Physiological Interpretation of a Syllogism.— We may 
picture the physiological process that accompanies 
the syllogism as follows : 

We may represent the two notions, major and minor, 
by two circles that do not intersect. We do not compare 
the notions directly. The nervous impulse will encounter 
so much resistance that it will not pass readily from one 



54 The Thinking Process 

combination into the other. But if we draw a third circle, 
representing the middle term M so that it shall have a 
section common to S and M, which we may call x, and 
another section common to M and P, which we may call 
y, the nervous impulse may pass from S into M through 




Physiological interpretation of the Syllogism. — Sx is M. Mx is P. 

the common section x, and from M it may pass readily into 
P by means of the common section y. Thus by means of 
introducing the middle circle, representing the middle term 
M, we shall find an easy passage from the center S to the 
center P. The resistance that would be so great as to 
prevent the passage directly is diminished to such an 
extent by going through M by means of the common 
sections x and y that the nervous impulse passes readily 
from one to the other. 

Simplicity of the Hypothesis. — While the process as 
described is altogether hypothetical, and is without doubt 
much simpler than that which actually occurs, it is in its 
simplicity comparable to the syllogism itself as a form of 
reasoning, and will enable us to comprehend the process 
by means of the physiological image. In fact, it will be 
found possible to describe reasoning in physiological 
terms as the concomitant of the process by which we find 
an easy passage for the impulse from one combination of 
cells into another that is not directly connected with it. 



The Syllogism 55 

Fallacies. — It is very easy to derive a false conclusion 
from true premises. In fact, it is very difficult to employ 
the syllogism in a proper way. The wrong kind of 
reasoning by which a false conclusion is reached is called 
a fallacy. There are many fallacies and rules to be 
observed in the employment of the syllogism, and we 
shall merely indicate some of the most common. 

Undistributed Middle —The first fallacy is called that of 
the undistributed middle and is illustrated by the following 
syllogism : 

All insects breathe by spiracles. 
A centipede breathes by spiracles. 
A centipede is an insect ; 

which is not true. The difficulty lies in the middle term, 
expressing the general notion of spiracle breathing. It is 
not used in either proposition to include everything that 
breathes by spiracles. In the first proposition the term 
spiracle breathing includes only those spiracle breathers 
that are insects, and in the other proposition it includes 
only those spiracle breathers that are centipedes. So in 
neither case does it include all spiracle breathers and 
therefore is said to be undistributed. In the major pre- 
mise we compare the notion insect with one group of 
spiracle breathers, and in the other premise we compare 
the notion centipede with a different group. So, instead 
of comparing the two notions, insect and centipede, with 
the same notion, we really compare them with different 
notions, or different parts of the same notion. Hence in 
reality we have four terms instead of three. The middle 
term must always be distributed, and every term that is 
distributed in the conclusion must be distributed in one of 
the premises. Distributed means to be used in such a way 
as to include everything to which the notion belongs. In 



56 The Thinking Process 

order that a term may be distributed it must be used as 
the subject of a universal or the predicate of a negative. 

Illicit Process. — Another fallacy is called the fallacy of 
the illicit process of the major, which is merely another 
name for the fallacy of the undistributed major term. The 
major term is distributed in the conclusion when it is not 
distributed in the premises. 

All injurious insects should be killed. 
A cockroach is not an injurious insect. 
A cockroach should not be killed. 

The conclusion is not true. The major term is " Should 
be killed ", and it is not distributed in the major premise. 
There are other things that should be killed besides inju- 
rious insects. The term is used as the predicate of a uni- 
versal affirmative, instead of the subject. It is distributed 
in the conclusion, because it is used as the predicate of a 
negative. Hence we get an invalid conclusion. 

Particular Premises.— Look at this syllogism : 

Some insects have red wings. 

Some grasshoppers do not have red wings. 

Some grasshoppers are not insects. 

Here the difficulty is not in the undistributed middle nor 
the major term. The middle is distributed, since it is used 
as the predicate of a negative. It is true that the major is 
not distributed in the premise, but there is no way to avoid 
this when both premises are particular propositions. The 
rule is that from two particular propositions no conclusion 
can be drawn. One of the premises must be universal. 

Negative Premises.— 

No insect has ten legs. 

No grasshopper has ten legs. 

A grasshopper is not an insect. 



The Syllogism 57 

This illustrates the rule about negative propositions, which 
is that from two negative premises no conclusion can be 
drawn. One of the premises must be an affirmative. This 
fallacy is well illustrated by the conundrum, " Why is an 
elephant like a wheelbarrow ?" And the answer is, " Be- 
cause neither of them can climb a tree." 

Ambiguous Middle. — To the fallacy of ambiguous middle 
belongs the proof that a cat has ten tails. No cat has nine 
tails. One cat has one tail more than no cat. Therefore, 
one cat has ten tails. So also we shall be able to see the 
fallacy in the demonstration that two is equal to zero, that 
every aspiring beginner in algebra so confidently shows to 
his teacher. The square root of 1 is 1. The square root 
of 1 is minus 1. Minus 1 equals plus 1, since things that 
are equal to the same thing are equal to each other. Add- 
ing 1 to both members of the equation, shows us that two 
equals zero. The fallacy lies in the ambiguous middle 
term. The square root of 1 may be either plus 1 or 
minus 1. 

It will be seen from the above examples that 
the syllogism must be applied in the right way to obtain 
valid conclusions even from correct premises. We have 
indicated only four or five kinds of fallacies, but it is easily 
possible to discover twenty or thirty different kinds. 

Figure. — Writers on logic speak of the figure of the 
syllogism. By this they mean the arrangement of the dif- 
erent terms in the propositions, or it might be described as 
the position of the middle term in the two premises. 

The middle term may be used as the subject of both 
premises, as the predicate of both premises, as the subject 
of the major and the predicate of the minor, as the predi- 
cate of the major and the subject of the minor. In the 
first figure the middle term is used as the subject of the 
major and the predicate of the minor. 



58 The Thinking Process 

First Figure.— 

All insects have six legs. 
A grasshopper is an insect. 
A fc^rasshopper has six legs. 

This figure may be represented by the formula MP-SM- 
SP. 

Second Figure. — In the second figure the middle term 
is used as the predicate in both major and minor premises. 

All insects have six legs. 

A centipede does not have six legs. 

A centipede is not an insect. 

The formula for this figure may be written PM-SM-SP. 

Third Figure. — In the third figure the middle term is 
used as the subject of both premises. 

All insects have six legs. 

All insects breathe by spiracles. 

Some spiracle breathers have six legs. 

The formula for this figure may be written MP-MS-SP. 

Some questions may be raised why in our conclusion 
we say some, making the conclusion particular, while the 
premises are both universal. If the conclusion were to be 
universal, we should distribute the minor term in the con- 
clusion, using it as the subject of an universal, when it is 
not distributed in the premises, where it is used as the 
predicate of an affirmative. So we shall find that every 
figure has its own rules, which must be regarded in order 
to obtain a correct conclusion. 

Fourth Figure. — In the fourth figure, the middle term 
is used as the predicate of the major and the subject of the 
minor premise. 



The Syllogism 59 

All insects have six legs. 

A six-legged animal is not a spider. 

A spider is not an insect. 

The formula may be written PM-MS-SP. 

Mood. — Writers on logic also distinguish another 
property of the syllogism which they call mood. By 
mood they mean the different kinds of propositions that 
enter into the syllogism. There are four kinds of propo- 
sitions, and only three are necessary to make up a syllo- 
gism. So it would appear at first sight that there are 64 
possible moods. Sixty-four different arrangements of 
four letters, A E I 0, may be made using three at a time. 
There may be sixteen beginning with A, sixteen beginning 
with E and sixteen each with I and 0. But an examina- 
tion will show that many of these combinations must be 
rejected. All those combinations that have E and as 
the first two must be rejected, because E and represent 
negative premises. So all combinations that have for the 
first two letters and I must be rejected, because they 
represent syllogisms in which both premises are particular. 
All combinations in which one of the letters represent a 
negative premise while the conclusion is affirmative must 
be rejected, as well as all of those in which one of the 
premises is particular and the conclusion is universal. We 
shall thus find that there are only ten legitimate moods, 
which may be expressed by the combinations AAA, EAE, 
All, EIO, AEE, AOO, AAI, IAI, EAO, OAO. 

Mnemonic Lines. — There is a series of barbarous 
mnemonic lines that are intended to indicate the moods 
that are legitimate in each figure. The lines are packed 
with information most of which it is unnecessary to learn, 
and it is wholly unnecessary to commit them to memory. 
The original lines are in Latin, but the only part which it 



60 The Thinking Process 

is necessary for us to understand is the series of words 
which represent the moods. The moods are indicated by 
the vowels in the words, while the consonants indicate 
certain operations that may be performed upon the syllo- 
gisms. The legitimate moods are represented by the words 

First figure — Barbara, celarent, darii, ferio. 

Second figure — Cesare, camestres, festino, baroko. 

Third figure — Darapti, disamis, datisi, felapton, 
bokardo, ferison. 

Fourth figure — Bramantip, dimaris, camenes, fesapo, 
fresison. 

Although in these lines there are nineteen different words 
indicating nineteen moods, there are so many duplications 
that only ten different combinations of vowels are found. 
The different moods are recognized by the words in the 
lines. Thus the mood that contains three universal affir- 
mative propositions is always known as the mood barbara. 
So when we wish to indicate the mood in the fourth 
figure that has both of its premises universal affirmative 
and its conclusion a particular affirmative, we always 
speak of the mood bramantip. 

This discussion will show something of the nature of 
the study that has been put upon the syllogism. The 
importance of the syllogism as a method of reasoning is 
not very great; but it furnishes us an easy introduction 
into the reasoning process, and the real nature of the 
psychological movement upon which reasoning depends. 



DEFINITIONS 

Syllogism. — A syllogism is a series of three proposi- 
tions, two of which are so related to each other that the 
third may be derived from them. 



The Syllogism 61 

Conclusion. — The third proposition in the syllogism. 

Premises. — The two propositions other than the con- 
clusion. 

Middle Term. — The middle term is the one that occurs 
in both premises. 

Major Term. — The major term is the predicate of the 
conclusion. 

Minor Term. — The subject of the conclusion. 

Major Premise. — The premise that contains the major 
term. 

Minor Premise. — The premise that contains the minor 
term. 

Fallacy. — An error in reasoning by which a false con- 
clusion is drawn. 

Illicit Process. — That fallacy that arises from the major 
term's being distributed in the conclusion when it is not 
distributed in the premise. 

Undistributed. — Used in a manner that does not indi- 
cate the full extent of its signification. 

Figure. — That property of the syllogism that designates 
the position of the middle term in the premises. 

Mood. — That property of the syllogism that designates 
the kind of propositions which constitute it. 



CHAPTER VI 

DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE REASONING 

The sense of sameness is the very keel and backbone of our 
thinking.— James Psychology, Volume I, p. 459. 

Science arises from the discovery of identity amidst diversity. 
— In every act of inference, or scientific method we are engaged 
about a certain likeness, identity, sameness, similarity, resemblance, 
analogy, equivalence, or equality apparent between two objects. — 
Jevons, Principles oj Science, p. / . 

By no inductive process can we prove the universal. But 
reason, assuming the uniformity of thought, universalizes the 
uniformity of nature. — Lloyd Morgan, Comparative Psychology, p. 285. 

The uniformity of nature is a condition of all mental develop- 
ment, as of all reasoning; but it is not conceived as a condition until 
reason is firmly seated on her throne. — Lloyd Morgan, Comparative 
Psychology, p. 285. 

This principle (of identity) , is therefore the highest form of 
thought, the postulate on which all science depends. The relation 
of similarity underlying all association of ideas is expressed by the 
principle of identity in an ideal and absolute form which our actual 
associations attain at best only approximately. — Hoffding, p. 177. 

Limitations of the Syllogism.— The syllogism has some 
very serious limitations, that largely diminish its useful- 
ness. In the first place, not all forms of reasoning are 
capable of being reduced to the syllogistic form. I look 
up at the sun and say that the sun dazzles my eyes. Or 
I lay a lath between two tables and propose to walk across 
it. The reasoning process by which you arrive at the 
conclusion that the lath will break and precipitate me to 
the floor is enormously complex; too complex ever to be 
reduced to the form of a syllogism. Even if we were to 
undertake to reduce the demonstration of a simple 
theorem in geometry to a series of syllogisms, we should 
find that the process is very long and difficult to accom- 
plish. 



- 



Reasoning 63 

Fallacies. — In the second place, it is difficult to avoid 
fallacies in making use of syllogistic reasoning. Some 
kinds of fallacies are difficult to detect. In the preceding 
chapter we have mentioned five kinds, but it would be 
easy to extend the list to twenty-five. We can seldom 
affirm that we have avoided every possible fallacy, and 
must always assert the validity of our conclusion subject 
to the qualification "If we have avoided all fallacies." 

Not Affirm Truth of the Premises.— The third limitation 
is that the syllogism does not affirm anything about the 
truth of the premises. All that it does affirm is that if 
the premises are true and all fallacies are avoided, then 
the conclusion is true. But the test of the truth of the 
premises must be made by some other means than by the 
syllogism itself. 

Not Discover The Premises.— The fourth limitation is 
somewhat like the third. The syllogism does not enable 
us to obtain the general truths that are used as the 
premises in any train of reasoning. We must have the 
general truths, one of which at least must be universal, 
but there is no way in which they may be obtained by 
syllogistic reasoning. This in itself shows that the syllo- 
gism is not an all-sufficient form of reasoning. 

A fifth limitation is that the syllogism does not dis- 
close any new truth. Everything that is affirmed in the 
conclusion has already been stated in the premises. When 
I have said that all insects have six legs, I have stated the 
fact already about the grasshopper. The conclusion is 
already involved in the premises. 

One Advantage. — The one advantage of the syllogism 
is that it discloses truth that is involved in the premises 
when we should not discover that it is there unless it 
were disclosed by such a process. The truth that the 



64 The Thinking Process 

surface of a sphere is equal to the area of four great 
circles is involved in the definition of a sphere, a circle, 
and two or three other definitions and axioms ; but we 
should never discover the truth in these definitions and 
axioms if it were not for the process of reasoning. 

Deductive Reasoning. — Syllogistic reasoning was re- 
garded, from the time of Aristotle down to the time of 
Francis Bacon, as the only form of reasoning. It was 
believed that the mind always reasoned syllogistically and 
that if we wished to do so, all processes of reasoning 
could be reduced to the syllogistic form. Francis Bacon 
described a different form of reasoning which is called 
induction. The syllogism is the best example of deductive 
reasoning. 

Inductive Reasoning. — Deductive reasoning begins 
with general truths and reasons to a particular conclu- 
sion. The premises with which we start are always wider 
than the conclusion. It is a process of reasoning from 
the general to the particular. Inductive reasoning starts 
with the particulars and reasons to the general. The 
premises are never so wide as is the conclusion. 

If I wish to discover the general truth that all insects 
have six legs, I begin with particular individuals. I 
examine an insect and count the number of its legs. 
Then I examine as many more insects as I can, and per- 
haps induce all my friends to examine and report the 
number of legs that they discover on insects. Suppose 
that I and my friends have counted the number of legs on 
a hundred thousand insects, then from this I reach the 
conclusion that all insects have six legs. 

One Limitation. — There is one limitation on inductive 
reasoning as it is here described, and that is that there is 



Reasoning 65 

no way of being certain that after having counted the 
number of legs on a hundred thousand insects, the very 
next insect examined may have not six but eight, or four, 
or some other number. The sun has always risen in the 
east, but there is no necessary connection, so far as the 
reasoning process can discover, that will make it impos- 
sible for it to rise in the north or west tomorrow. So 
inductive reasoning cannot assert absolute certainty. 

Complete Induction. — There is one process by which 
absolute certainty may be attained, and that is by a pro- 
cess of complete induction, in which every particular is 
examined. The earth has only one moon. Everything 
that by any possibility might be a moon has been examined, 
and only one has been found. There is no student in 
school that is more than 150 years old. Every student 
has been examined in this respect. There is no building 
in Ypsilanti that is 13 stories high. Every building has 
been examined. In this way absolute certainty can be 
obtained. 

Not Reasoning'. — There are two things to be said about 
complete induction. One of them is that it is not a form 
of reasoning at all, and does not differ from direct obser- 
vation. The other limitation is that there is no gain by 
such a reasoning process. The conclusion is no wider 
than the premises. So all the gain and the increase in 
knowledge that we can acquire in reasoning must come 
from incomplete induction. 

Suppose that I have examined a hundred thousand 
insects, and have found that all of them have six legs. I 
reason from this to the general conclusion that all insects 
have six legs. The conclusion is wider than the premises. 



66 The Thinking Process 

How Reach Inductive Conclusion.— The process by 
which this conclusion is reached may be clearly stated in 
the following series of propositions : 

All insects that I have examined have six legs. 

All insects are like those that I have examined. 

All insects have six legs. 
It will be seen that this train of reasoning takes the form 
of a syllogism of which the major premise is a complete 
induction, all insects that I have examined have six legs. 
The minor premise is an assumption without any positive 
evidence of its truth, and this is the possible source of 
error. The conclusion is derived from these two premises. 

The Premises.— In the first premise, "All insects that I 
have examined " is the middle term. The major term is, 
" Have six legs." In the minor premise the minor term is 
"All insects." We see that the syllogism contains three 
propositions, all of them universal affirmative. It is a syl- 
logism of the first figure and of the mood barbara, and we 
shall find that the first figure of the syllogism is involved 
in every process of inductive reasoning. 

Uniformity of Nature. — Every process of inductive rea- 
soning involves this deductive process. The minor premise 
is obtained by assuming the uniformity of those things that 
we have not examined with those things that we have 
examined. Putting it in very general terms, we may say 
that every induction involves an assumption of the uni- 
formity of nature. I believe that the sun will rise tomor- 
row, for my total experience has been that it has risen 
every morning. It has always risen in the east, and it is 
easy for me to believe that it will rise in the east again, 
although there is nothing in the nature of my reasoning 
process that would compel me to assent to the proposition 
that it might not rise in the west tomorrow. If any one 



Reasoning 67 

choses to assert that it will rise in the west tomorrow 
morning, and challenge me to prove that it would not, 
although I might suspect his sanity, I should be compelled 
to reply, " Let us wait and see." 

Origin of Intuitive Ideas.— The fact that every insect 
that I have examined has six legs makes it easy for me to 
believe that every other insect, when it is examined, will 
be found to have six legs, and it is easy for me to make 
the assumption without having examined every particular. 
The experience of our ancestors with certain things has 
been just like our own, and has probably contributed to 
our readiness to assume the truth of the axioms of mathe- 
matics, and the things that were designated by former 
psychologists as intuitive ideas and necessary self-evident 
truths. 

Superstitions.^-No reasoning process is possible with- 
out this belief in the uniformity of nature, and yet our 
belief in such uniformity is not very strong. When we 
overturn the salt cellar, we throw a pinch of salt over our 
shoulder. This implies that we do not believe that things 
will go on as they did before we overturned the salt cellar. 
So we knock on wood, refuse to turn back when we have 
forgotten something, hang a snake on the fence, watch for 
the moon over our right shoulder. These things imply a 
belief in the fact that nature is not uniform, but that some- 
thing may constantly interfere to change the course of 
natural events. It really involves the kind of fallacy that 
is called irrelevant conclusion. In case of these supersti- 
tions, there is not the necessary connection between our 
actions and the events they are supposed to influence that 
We assume that there is. 

Insufficient Number of Particulars.— One serious error 
in making an induction is the failure to examine a suffi- 



68 The Thinking Process 

cient number of particulars to avoid a wrong assumption. 
We assume a uniformity of the things that we have not 
seen with the things that we have seen, when an examina- 
tion of a larger number of particulars would show that 
they are not similar. Thus the square of three is nine and 
the square of four is sixteen. The sum of nine and six- 
teen is twenty-five, which is a perfect square. So the 
square of six is thirty-six and the square of eight is sixty- 
four. The sum of thirty-six and sixty-four is one hundred, 
which is a perfect square. The sums of all squares that I 
have examined are perfect squares ; the sums of all squares 
are like those that I have examined ; therefore the sum of 
any two squares will be a perfect square, which is not true. 
An examination of sufficient number of particulars will 
enable us to avoid such mistakes. 

Induction and Deduction Inseparable.— The conclusion 
obtained by inductive reasoning is a general truth that 
may be used as the major premise in a syllogism or other 
form of deductive reasoning. Thus we see that every 
deduction demands a previous induction, and we have also 
seen that every inductive conclusion is reached by a deduc- 
tive process, so that deduction and induction cannot be 
separated, but must always go along together. In fact, 
there are not two processes, but a single process. Writers 
on logic are now inclined to talk about the deductive-in- 
ductive process, but it appears that we may make a more 
nearly accurate analysis of the entire process. In deduc- 
tion, we perceive the resemblance between two notions, 
and in induction we perceive the resemblance between the 
particulars from which the notion is derived. The two 
processes are identical in the fact that they both consist in 
the perception of resemblance, and this is the fact that 
connects reasoning with all other forms of the intellectual 



Reasoning 69 

process. Reasoning is merely a complex form of resimila- 
tion, as judgment and generalization are simpler forms. 
We already have a physiological interpretation for the 
process of resimilation, and so find it possible to think of 
reasoning in physiological terms. 

DEFINITIONS 

Deduction. — A process of reasoning from generals to 
particulars. The syllogism is the most typical form of 
deductive reasoning. 

Induction. — A process of reasoning from particulars 
to generals. 

Complete Induction. — A process of drawing a conclusion 
from an examination of every particular. 

Incomplete Induction. — A process of drawing a uni- 
versal conclusion from an examination of only a part of 
the particulars. 



CHAPTER VII 

OTHER FORMS OF REASONING 

Knowledge is impossible without hypotheses.-— f/aecfc/, 
Wonders of Life, p. 86. 

To make hypotheses, to verify them by experiment, then to 
connect by the aid of generalizations the facts discovered, rep- 
resents the stages necessary for the building up of all our knowledge. 
— LefBon, Evolution of Matter, p. 317. 

It is only in the present century that physicists have begun to 
recognize this truth (i. e., that while science was supposed to be 
advancing by the Baconian method, hypothetical investigation was 
the real instrument of progress) . So much opprobrium had been 
attached by Bacon to the use of hypotheses that we find Young 
speaking of them in an apologetic tone.— Jevons, Principles of Science, 
p. 508. 

Among uncultivated observers, the tendency to remark the 
favorable and to forget the unfavorable events is so great that no 
reliance can be placed upon their supposed observations.— Jevons, 
p. 402, 

All science starts with hypothesis. — Huxley, Hume, p. 65. 

Since perception rests upon a process that may be described 
as involuntary comparison, it manifests itself as an activity of 
thought by means of which we appropriate what is given in the 
sensation, incorporate the sensation into the content of our con- 
sciousness. — Hoffding, p. 130. 

Analogy. — In deduction we begin with the general 
and reason to the particular ; we begin with the many 
and reason to the one. In induction we begin with the 
particular and reason to the general ; we begin with the 
one and reason to the many. If we reduce the many that 
we begin with in deduction, and reduce the many that we 
reason to in induction, we shall ultimately approximate a 
condition in which we reason from one to one. Whether 



Forms of Reasoning 71 

this one that we begin with is the general of deduction or 
the particular of induction may be a question; and 
whether the one that we reach in the conclusion is the 
particular of deduction or the general of induction is also 
difficult to determine. By this process, however, we are 
able to show that deduction and induction are the same 
process. It is a process of reasoning from particular to 
particular, as described by John Stuart Mill, and which 
Jevons asserts is not a form of reasoning at all. It ap- 
pears, however, not only to be a form of reasoning, but 
the most common form. It is a special form of induction 
which we may call analogy. 

Differs From Baconian Induction. — The very name 
analogy implies the perception of resemblance. In 
reasoning by analogy we begin with a particular, and this 
is sufficient to indicate that reasoning by analogy is a form 
of induction. The difference however, is that in the 
typical Baconian induction, we begin with the largest 
number of particulars that we can get. In analogy, we 
do not try to secure the largest number of particulars, 
but, in the most common examples, we begin merely with 
one, and reason to the many, or the universal. 

Analogy is a valid form of reasoning and is the most 
common form of the reasoning process that we employ. 
It leads to valid conclusions if we observe the proper 
precautions. It is by this process that the larger number 
of our daily actions are determined. When I find the 
thermometer at my house flirting with the zero mark, I 
do not need to make an examination of as many 
thermometers as possible in order to come to the conclu- 
sion that I shall not find balmy zephyrs blowing around 
the normal school building. I do not need to observe the 
ice in the pond, the hardness of the ground, the other 
indications of frost of as many different kinds as possible, 



72 The Thinking Process 

to come to the decision that it is cold. When I start out 
and find one crossing is muddy, I do not need to examine 
all other crossings in town to induce me to go back and 
get my rubbers. I reason from the one particular that all 
other crossings are likely to be muddy. So when I find it 
raining at my house, I reason from this one particular that 
it is raining in every other place in town, and get my 
umbrella. 

Deductive Process In Analogy.— Like every other form 
of induction, analogy involves a deductive process. My 
reasoning is as follows : This crossing is muddy. Every 
crossing in town is like this crossing. Every crossing is 
muddy. The mistake may occur in the second, minor, 
premise. It may be that not all other crossings in town 
are like this crossing, and my reasoning will lead me to a 
wrong conclusion. 

Analogy In Geometrical Demonstration.— In geometry 
we employ the same process of reasoning. We have 
described the demonstrations in geometry as among the 
best examples of deductive reasoning, but there is also 
employed in them an inductive process which is that form 
that we have called analogy. When I have proved that 
in one triangle the three angles are equal to two right 
angles, I do not have to demonstrate it for as many tri- 
angles as I can draw, and as many as I can get my friends 
to draw. I reason from this one particular triangle to the 
general conclusion that the sum of the angles of all 
triangles is equal to two right angles. My minor 
premise is that All triangles are like this triangle, and if 
this premise is true my conclusion is a valid one. 

Fallacies In Analogy. — But sometimes the analogy does 
not involve any necessary connection between the things 
observed and others that are assumed to be like it. There 



Forms of Reasoning 73 

was a Mohammedan doctor who always prescribed a 
white medicine for a chill, red medicine for fever, and 
yellow medicine for jaundice. Similarly the story is told 
of a negro physician who when called upon to treat a case 
of hemorrhage of the lungs prescribed a dose of mustard 
and a dose of mucilage. He explained this system of 
therapeutics by saying that he wanted the mustard to 
draw the parts together and the mucilage to make them 
stick. When the planet Uranus was discovered, there 
were learned men who gravely argued that there could be 
no such planet as Uranus. There were only seven days 
in the week, only seven metals, seven colors in the rain- 
bow, seven intervals in the octave, and consequently 
there could be only seven planets. As there were five 
already known, the number with the earth and moon was 
complete, and no other planet was possible. The diffi- 
culty with this reasoning was that there was no necessary 
connection between the seven days in the week and the 
seven planets. 

Origin of Superstitious Beliefs.— Many common beliefs 
rest upon the evidence of analogy observed in a single 
particular, and contradictory instances are neglected. If 
it should rain on Easter Sunday it will rain for the 
succeeding seven Sundays. One time in boyhood, the 
writer observed this occurrence, and he has had a mild 
form of belief that it will always happen so. Potatoes 
planted in the light of the moon will all go to tops. A 
cloud coffin seen in the sky foretells the death of some 
one in the family. A bell ringing in one's ears indicates 
the same kind of disaster. A dog howling at night indi- 
cates a death, although in case of the writer, it is more 
likely to be the death of the dog. Most of such beliefs 
have probably arisen somewhere by the observation of a 
single instance, and the general conclusion has been 



74 The Thinking Process 

drawn. The only way to avoid such errors in reasoning 
is to look for the evidence of a necessary connection, and 
to examine a number of particulars, as well as to be 
especially watchful for contrary instances. 

Limitations of Analogy.— Sometimes an analogy will 
hold for a few instances and then break down. An 
equation containing one unknown quantity may be 
represented by a straight line. An equation containing 
two unknown quantities may be represented by a curve, 
enclosing a surface. An equation containing three un- 
known quantities, requires a solid to represent it. What 
would represent an equation containing four unknowns ? 
But it is from a consideration of such analogies that we 
derive our pseudo notion of a fourth dimension of space. 
A moving point will generate a line ; a moving line will 
generate a surface, a moving surface will generate a solid, 
but what will a moving solid generate ? The analogy 
breaks down at this point. 

Hypothesis. — Analogy is principally useful in suggest- 
ing a probable truth. By means of analogy we may make 
a guess at what a truth may be. We may act upon this 
probable truth, or if the case is an important one and does 
not demand immediate action, we may proceed to verify it. 
This leads us to the form of reasoning that is called hypo- 
thesis. Hypothetical reasoning begins with an examina- 
tion of particulars, just as does any other form of induction ; 
but in the typical Baconian induction we examine as many 
particulars as possible and draw our conclusion, with which 
the process stops. In hypothesis, we do not employ 
as many particulars as possible, but only a sufficient num- 
ber of the most significant. A small number of particu- 
lars, as unlike as possible, will be more serviceable in 
framing a hypothesis than a larger number of concordant 
examples. When we have drawn our conclusion from the 



Forms of Reasoning 75 

particulars considered, we have merely formed the hypo- 
thesis, from which we proceed to reason. The termination 
of the induction is merely the first step by which the truth 
is established. 

Second Step in Proof. — The hypothesis must agree with 
all the observed particulars. The second step is the col- 
lection and examination of new particulars. If all the new 
particulars which are discovered and examined fit into the 
hypothesis and none of them contradict it, then we have 
another reason for believing that it is true. The hypo- 
thesis was formed before the new particulars were exam- 
ined, and the fact that they fit into it is rather strong evi- 
dence of its truth. It is somewhat like the stories of two 
witnesses who have not consulted with each other. If 
neither knows what the other has told, the evidence is 
stronger than if they have consulted with each other and 
each has heard what the other has said. 

Third Step. — The third step in the verification of an 
hypothesis is a process of deductive reasoning. Assuming 
that the hypothesis is true, we may use it as a major 
premise and reason backward to the particulars. If the 
particulars that we reach by our process of deductive rea- 
soning correspond to the particulars that we observe, then 
our hypothesis is assuming a high degree of probability. 
When Newton proposed his hypothesis of gravitation, he 
proceeded to test it deductively. His hypothesis was that 
the moon, like other bodies, falls toward the earth with a 
velocity proportional directly to the mass and inversely as 
the square of the distance. He knew, or thought he knew, 
the size and mass of the earth, and the distance that it was 
from the moon. His calculations showed that the moon 
ought to fall toward the earth at the rate of thirteen feet 
a second, when direct observation showed that it did fall 



76 The Thinking Process 

at the rate of fifteen feet a second. The discrepancy was 
too great, and he abandoned his hypothesis. He laid his 
papers away, and thirteen years afterward, learning of a 
new measurement of the earth, he introduced this new 
value into his calculations, and found that the calculated 
distance agreed exactly with the observed distance. This 
agreement testified very strongly in favor of the hypothe- 
sis, and gave it a high degree of probability. 

Fourth Step, Prediction.— But there is a fourth step in 
the verification of an hypothesis. Assuming that the 
hypothesis is true, we may predict that other things are 
true, and search for those particulars which would not 
likely be found, if it were not for the hypothesis. If we 
can verify our predictions made from the hypothesis, we 
have approximated the demonstration of its truth as nearly 
as it is possible to demonstrate the truth of anything. 
There is no higher test of the truth of a general principle 
than this. 

Newton's theory of gravitation has led to many veri- 
fied predictions of this kind. After the planet Uranus was 
discovered, an orbit was calculated for it according to the 
laws of gravitation. In a few years the planet failed to 
move accurately in the orbit. Either the law of gravita- 
tion was not true, or there was some other cause for the 
variation from the orbit. Accordingly, an English mathe- 
matician, Adams, and a French astronomer, Leverrier, 
undertook to calculate the size, position and distance of a 
planet outside the orbit of Uranus that should account for 
its deviation. Leverrier on the very night that he finished 
his calculation wrote to his friend, Dr. Galle, in Berlin, 
telling him to point his telescope at a particular spot, and 
he would see a star of the eighth magnitude, which would 
be a new planet, never before seen. On the very evening 



Forms of Reasoning 77 

that he received the letter, Dr. Galle, following the direc- 
tions of Leverrier, saw the planet. This discovery furn- 
ished the highest possible evidence of the truth of the 
theory of gravitation. Marconi's discovery of wireless 
telegraphy came as a prediction based upon the theory of 
electric waves in ether. 

Examples of Hypothesis.— The theory of planetary 
orbits, Kepler's laws, the atomic theory of matter, the 
kinetic theory of gases, theory of light, luminiferous ether, 
evolution, or the derivative origin of species are all 
examples of discoveries made by hypothetical reasoning. 
We are sometimes told that the doctrine of evolution is 
merely a hypothesis, and has never been satisfactorily 
demonstrated. This is true, but no other theory, not even 
Newton's theory of gravitation, has furnished one one- 
hundredth as many examples of verified predictions as 
has the theory of evolution. Our hypothesis of the 
nervous current with its psychological concomitant for 
each element is another example of hypothetical reason- 
ing. We cannot say that it has been demonstrated, but 
if we find new phenomena that are explained by it, and if 
we are able to predict and to make psychological dis- 
coveries by means of it, and find nothing to contradict it, 
it will reach a high degree of probability. When it fails 
to do this, we must discard it, and substitute another 
theory. 

Validity of Hypothetical Reasoning.— By hypothetical 
reasoning we can more nearly approximate certainty than 
by any other process of reasoning whatever. Every 
great discovery in science has been made in this way. 
Notwithstanding the great admiration that has been 
expressed for Baconian induction, no great discovery has 
ever been made by means of it. The observation of 



78 The Thinking Process 

additional instances according to the Baconian system 
adds to the probability of the truth of the conclusion in 
an arithmetical progression. Thus, for every series of x 
instances we may express the probability of the truth of 
the Baconian conclusion as x plus x plus x plus x, which 
equals 4x. By means of the four lines of proof offered 
for hypothesis, we may have the product of four factors 
x times x times x times x, or x 4 . Hypothesis may not 
attain a result so certain as complete induction, but com- 
plete induction is not reasoning. 

Classification. — Classification is another form of 
reasoning. When we classify any object we put it into a 
class that has already been formed. Suppose that we are 
called upon to classify a plant. I examine it and find that 
it has all the characters that constitute the general ab- 
stract notion of Ambrosiaceae, or ragweed family. I 
classify it in that family. The reasoning process is as 
follows : 

x characters constitute my notion of Ambrosiaceae. 

This plant has x characters. 

This plant is an Ambrosiaceae. 
Such seems to be the process involved in every act of 
classification, and it demands that we know a good deal 
about the objects classified. The importance of this 
process in education is frequently overlooked and mis- 
understood. It involves, of course, a deductive process, 
and it is essentially and necessarily a perception of 
resemblances between the thing classified and the general 
abstract notion that constitutes the class in which we 
place it. 

Recognition. — Recognition involves a reasoning pro- 
cess. Whenever we recognize a person or a thing as 
something that has been before seen or heard of or read 



Forms of Reasoning 79 

about, we do it by a process of reasoning. I saw a man 
with a peculiar helmet shaped hat riding a bicycle down 
the street. Half an hour afterward I saw a man riding a 
bicycle up another street with the same helmet shaped 
hat. I arrived at the conclusion that it was the same man. 
The recognition of the hat was immediate. The recogni- 
tion of the man as the same man necessitated a process 
of reasoning. The process is a complex one, perhaps too 
complex to be stated in the form of a syllogism. The 
major premise involved the immediate recognition of the 
hat, or some other characteristic. The minor premise in- 
volves the assumption that the hat, or other character 
recognized directly is associated with the same characters 
that it was associated with before. Then the conclusion 
is drawn that this is the same man. 

Naming. — Naming, or giving a name to an object, in- 
volves a reasoning process. A little girl was precocious 
with her needle. She made doll dresses and was 
acquainted with the details of ladies' costume. She went 
out of the house and brought in a ball of snow, which she 
had scraped off the ledge above the base board. Some 
one said, "Alice, where did you get the snow ? " "O, I got 
it off the tuck of the house." She applied the word tuck 
to the ledge, thus giving it a name, and indicating that 
she perceived a resemblance between this feature of the 
architecture of the house and the character of a lady's 
dress to which the name tuck was applied. Whenever 
we give a name to anything we go through the same 
kind of a process. 

Reasoning Process in Apperception.— Such examples as 
the one given above are usually employed to illustrate 
the process which is called apperception, and it shows 
very clearly what reasoning process is involved in apper- 



80 The Thinking Process 

ception. But apperception is practically only a complex 
form of perception. It is the sum of all the sensations, 
both faint and vivid that enter into the percept of an ob- 
ject, with all the related ideas. The perception of the 
relation is the essential element in reasoning, so that we 
may describe apperception as a reasoning process. 

Reasoning Process in Perception. — But naming itself is 
scarcely more than perception, and perception involves 
the perception of resemblance between the qualities of an 
object. Hence in our most complex process of reasoning 
we are brought back again to the process of perception. 
In every process of reasoning we have found that there is 
the same deductive process, and we shall not be surprised 
to find in the process of perception itself an exemplifica- 
tion of the first figure of the syllogism, of the mood bar- 
bara. 

These qualities constitute the apple. 

My sensations correspond to these qualities. 

My sensations correspond to the apple. 

Similarity of All Intellectual Processes.— While the pro- 
cess of reasoning is very complex, and the complexity is 
indicated by our employment of the words constitute and 
correspond, it is possible to show that the process of reason- 
ing and the process of perception involve the same essen- 
tial elements. So the point at which we have arrived is 
our study of the most complex processes of the intellect 
is the point from which we started. The whole intellec- 
tual process in all its degrees of complexity resolves itself 
into the one process of resimilation, or perception of re- 
semblance, and we have a physiological interpretation for 
that. The perception of resemblance is the concomitant 
of the transmission of an impulse through the brain cells 
that are common to two or more cell combinations. 



Forms of Reasoning 81 

DEFINITIONS 

Analogy. — A process of reasoning from a single in- 
stance to a general conclusion. 

Hypothesis. — A tentative inductive conclusion : A pro- 
cess of reasoning by which we verify an inductive conclu- 
sion. 

Classification. — A process by which we group an object 
with those that are like it. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE THINKING PROCESS. 

There are every year works published whose contents show 
them to be by real lunatics. " : - * Take the obscurer passages from 
Hegel : It is a fair question whether the rationality included in them 
be anything more than the fact that the words belong to a common 
vocabulary, and are strung together on a scheme of predication and 
relation, immediacy, self-relation, and what-not, that has habitually 
recurred. Yet there seems no reason to doubt that the subjective 
feeling of the rationality of these sentences was strong in the writer 
as he penned them, or even that some readers by straining may 
have reproduced it in themselves.— James, Vol. I, p. 264. 

The sense of our personal identity is exactly like any one of 
our other perceptions of sameness among phenomena.— James, Vol. 
I, p. 334. 

From our preceding remarks it seems that the nature of mind 
is its behavior generalized. — Baldwin, Development and Evolution, p. 274. 

In the unity which embraces and holds together the different 
ideas and sensations and makes their interaction possible, lies the 
germ of the conception of the ego, or the self. — Hoffding, p. 136. 

Thinking. — Thinking is the process of perceiving rela- 
tions, and we have seen that every relation may be reduced 
to the single form of resemblance. Thinking, then, is 
reduced to the process of perceiving resemblances. Every 
form of thinking may be reduced to this process, and the 
one common element is found in all. We have described 
the forms that have been recognized under the names of 
judgment, reasoning, generalization, and we might include 
under the same head, perception in its simplest forms. 
But some examples of thinking that are not commonly 
recognized as reducible to either of these forms remain to 
be discussed. 



The Thinking Process 83 

Humor.— In every form of wit or humor will be found 
this same element of perception of resemblance. A pun 
is sometimes called the lowest form of humor, and it de : 
pends wholly for its force upon the resemblance between 
the forms of two words, whose meanings are generally 
incongruous. While the humor, or fun, is a feeling, it is 
one that accompanies a thinking process, and a resem- 
blance must always be perceived. The point of the joke 
is in the perception of resemblance, and if the resemblance 
is not perceived, the point is lost, and the funny feeling is 
not experienced. 

Poetry. — True poetry is an expression of the highest 
form of thinking. A true poet is one who perceives the 
relations existing between ideas which an ordinary person, 
who is not a poet, will fail to discover, and may reach only 
by a laborious and round-about process of reasoning. 
These resemblances the poet perceives by a " flash of in- 
spiration," or " poetical insight." This flash of genius, or 
fire of inspiration has never been sufficiently recognized 
nor analyzed nor associated with other processes. It con- 
sists essentially in the perception of relations which do not 
appear to the ordinary man. In this respect the poet is 
like the great mathematical geniuses, or mathematical 
prodigies who make calculations with lightning-like rap- 
idity, involving the instantaneous perception of relations 
that are Worked out with difficulty by the ordinary man. 
To Newton, in his eighteenth year, the theorems of Euclid 
appeared to be self-evident, although most of our high 
school students arrive at the conclusions only by a diffi- 
cult process of reasoning. 

Genius. — Genius of any kind is manifested by the per- 
ception of relations that the non-genius can comprehend 
only by repetition, slow reasoning, and a long process of 



84 The Thinking Process 

thinking. The genius reaches the same goal by direct 
route, across lots, that the ordinary non-genius must reach 
by a roundabout journey. So the true poet, like any other 
genius, is an example of the highest kind of thinking. 

Belie!. — Belief arises whenever the relations are 
clearly perceived. The purpose of reasoning is to lead to 
the perception of relations; but reasoning is not more 
likely to induce belief than is any other process by which 
the relations are clearly perceived. Reasoning has already 
been described as the psychological concomitant of the 
process by which a nervous impulse is caused to pass 
from one brain center into another with which it has no 
cells in common. It makes no difference by what method 
the impulse is caused to pass ; if the pathway connecting 
the two centers is sufficiently free, then belief arises. 
The similarity is perceived. In youth, when the cells are 
growing and sending out dendrites, and changing their 
shape and opening up connections with other cells, it is 
easy to direct the impulse from one center into another, 
with which in after years the connection would be made 
with difficulty. This is the psychological and physiologi- 
cal explanation of the fact that early teachings result in 
beliefs that can seldom be modified or overthrown. 

Belief From Repetition.— Repetition will ultimately 
occasion belief, if the contradictory idea is inhibited, or 
does not arise. If the thing is asserted a sufficient 
number of times, belief will inevitably follow. No argu- 
ment is so convincing as bald assertion, if the assertion is 
made a sufficient number of times, and the contradictory 
idea is prevented from arising. This is the psychological 
principle that lies at the foundation of advertising- 
Nothing would seem 4p be more foolish than to repeat the 
same assertion time after time, but each repetition pro- 



The Thinking Process 85 

duces its effect. Association by coexistence will become 
as powerful, ultimately, as any other form of resemblance. 
Given a sufficient number of trials the nervous impulse 
will pass from one brain center to another, no matter how 
remote they may be, nor how great the resistance between 
them is. 

Belief From Attention.— Attention is the process by 
which a nervous impulse may be directed. Resistance 
may be increased in one direction and diminished in 
another. Thus attention may hasten the effect of repeti- 
tion, or even render repetition unnecessary. So we shall 
come to perceive relations between any two things to 
which we attend, no matter how unrelated they may at 
first appear to be. So we shall come to believe in that to 
which we attend in a proper, positive way, no matter how 
absurd the thing may be on its face, nor how much it is 
contradicted by the testimony of the senses. The absurdity 
of the thing in which the person believes cannot be con- 
sidered evidence of lack of mental integrity, for the wisest 
men have advocated most absurd propositions. 

Metaphysics. — These facts, that any kind of an associa- 
tion is possible ; that any two brain centers may be 
connected ; that the nervous impulse by repetition, 
reasoning, or early teaching may be induced to pass from 
any brain center into any other, is sufficient to make us 
distrust any conclusion that is reached by a process of 
reasoning alone. In order to justify our faith in any 
conclusion, we must be able to check it up by facts of the 
external world and bring it to judgment by scientific 
means. The testimony of consciousness is always fallible 
in consequence of the possibility of directing our nervous 
impulse into any brain center, and arousing belief by the 
various means suggested. Hence it is that the great 



86 The Thinking Process 

metaphysical systems that have been promulgated from 
time to time must always be distrusted as systems of 
ultimate truth, unless they are verified by the means 
proposed in the discussion of hypothetical reasoning. The 
fact that no two great metaphysical systems are consonant 
with each other, but are mutually exclusive, seems to 
indicate that they will not endure the tests applied to 
hypothetical reasoning. But that one person is unable to 
discover any indications of sanity in the system of one 
philosopher should not indicate to us that the philosopher 
is lacking in sanity. He sees the relations that he thinks 
he sees. The difficulty is that another person is unable 
to cause an impulse to traverse the same route between 
two brain centers. Hence it is that all metaphysical 
systems which fail to pass the tests applied to hypotheti- 
cal reasoning are not likely to have a very high value in 
developing a scientific conception of the world and the 
functions of human life in it. 

Children's Reasoning.— We are sometimes asked if 
little children reason. The question is scarcely a proper 
one until we have clearly stated a definition of reasoning. 
If we define reasoning as the perception of resemblances, 
as is done in this book, then of course children reason. 
The little three and a half year old boy who said "If this 
(motioning with his hand) is below, then this (another 
motion) is be up," reasoned as truly as did any philosopher. 
So the little boy who said to his father, sweeping out an 
aquarium "What are you brooming it out for ? " reasoned 
very truly. He perceived resemblance between the noun 
and the name of the action that led him to coin a new 
word. The evidence that children do not reason is 
generally derived from the fact that children's actions are 
sometimes different from those that a grown-up man 



The Thinking Process 87 

would perform in the same situation. The difficulty is 
not that the child did not reason; but that he did not 
inhibit his reasoning by the contradictory modifying idea. 
He reasoned and reached his conclusion too promptly, 
without delaying his reasoning process, c. 

Unity of all Intellectual Processes.— We see that it is 
difficult to discriminate a reasoning process from any 
other intellectual operation. Perception and reasoning 
are so similar that it is possible to discover the same 
essential element in. the two, and it is difficult to draw the 
line of separation. It is scarcely necessary nor advisable 
to separate the intellectual process into its different 
varieties on the basis of complexity, since the different 
degrees shade into each other. It is a maxim in botany 
and zoology that if two different forms of animals or 
plants are connected by an indefinite number of inter- 
mediate forms the two belong to the same species, and to 
the same line of descent. Applying this principle to the 
processes of the intellect we shall see that it is necessary 
to discard all specific distinctions in the intellectual pro- 
cesses. 

The Ego, or Empirical Self.— The perception of resem- 
blance is the very core of the idea of personal identity. 
Every mental process is similar to every other mental 
process. We should not call them all mental if they were 
not. But the mental processes of one person are abso- 
lutely distinct from the mental processes of another 
person, and this constitutes the boundary line between 
different persons, or individuals. The ego idea is obtained, 
like any other general abstract notion, by the process of 
generalization, from a comparison of mental experiences. 
It is no more an intuitive idea than is any other. 



88 The Thinking Process 

Personal Identity.— We have found the physiological 
concomitant of the element of sameness in mental pro- 
cesses to be transmission of a nervous impulse through 
the same brain cells that have been traversed before. So 
we may find the concomitant of the element of sameness 
that belongs to all mental experiences in the transmission 
of an impulse in the same circumstance. After a sufficient 
number of impulses have been transmitted, a sufficient 
number of brain cells developed and brain centers formed, 
it becomes practically impossible for a child to have a 
mental experience that does not involve transmissions 
through centers, some of whose cells have been traversed 
before in other combinations. This we may assume to be 
the concomitant of sameness in all mental processes, and 
the basis of continuity involved between any series of 
mental processes and any other. 

Alterations of Personality.— As the brain cells change, 
the identity changes, and the person becomes a different 
being from what the little child was. Alterations of per- 
sonality are pathological interruptions of this physiologi- 
cal continuity, and were it complete, the total personality 
would be altered and a new person developed. 

Motives to Action. — Thinking consists in the perception 
of relations. It may or may not terminate in action. If 
the relations perceived are those between the individual 
and some other object, it will in all probability result in 
action. If the relation perceived is between two terms or 
circumstances, neither one of which is the individual, no 
action follows. 

Idea as Motive. — Many actions are performed without 
thought. They are reflexes arising from nervous connec- 
tions that are already organized in the individual, have 



The Thinking Process 89 

been established by variation, fixed by natural selection, 
and transmitted by heredity. The motive to an action is 
the idea of the action itself, or the idea of the result of the 
action. In order that an idea shall result in action, it must 
be the idea of that action or of its result. If the idea is an 
idea of some other kind, it does not constitute a motive to 
action. When the perception of relations terminates in 
the idea of an action, then thinking results in activity. 
Otherwise, thinking does not necessarily do so. 

Thinking and Racial Superiority.— The human race holds 
its position at the head of animated creation in conse- 
quence of its greater intellectual power, which is expressed 
by saying its ability to think, or to perceive relations. 
Man perceives relations that other animals are unable to 
discover, and thinking determines the actions by means of 
which man maintains himself at the head of the animal 
kingdom. It is thinking that determines what actions will 
be advantageous to him, and the process results in direct 
benefit to the individual, preserving him from dangers, or 
adjusting him better to the situation in which he finds 
himself placed. 



INDEX 



Abstraction 22 

Abstract Notion 21, 28 

Affirmative judgment 43 

Analogy... 70 

Analysis 22 

Angell's figure for association 15 

Argon.. _ 26 

Association 7 

centers of 17 

formula for, Titchener's 14 

laws of _ _ 7 

simultaneous.. _ ...13 

successive 13 

Attention 85 

Belief 84 

Centrally initiated impulse.. 21 

Character. 40 

Children's reasoning ._ 87 

Classification... ...78 

Comparison ...23, 27, 30 

Complete induction 65 

Comprehension 38 

Common noun ...21 

Concrete notion _ 8 

Contiguity 8 

Copula 44 

Crousaz... .45 

Deduction ___64 

Deductive reasoning 64 

Definitions 19, 32, 41, 50, 61, 69, 81 

Definition, logical— 35 

Differences, table 26 

Differentia 34 

Discrimination 23, 26 

Extension 38 

Fallacies ...56 

Faint sensations 21 

Figures of the syllogism 57 

Flechsig ..17 

Formula for association.Titcheners.14 

General abstract notion 21, 28 

Generalization 40 

Genius 83 

Genus _ 34 

summum 39 



Gravitation _. ...76 

Hypothesis 75 

verification of 76 

Humor 83 

Identity 45 

personal _ 86 

Imagination 18 

Inductive reasoning 64 

Induction, complete 77 

Judgment 42 

affirmative 43 

negative 43 

particular 46 

qualitative 43 

relations of 48 

universal _ 46 

Knowledge 30 

Lord Rayliegh 26 

Life, defined ._ .39 

Limitations of the syllogism 62 

Logical definition 35 

Mathematical prodigies.. 68,83 

Man's superiority 88 

Metaphysical systems „ 85 

Mind. _ 40 

Mill, John Stuart 71 

Mnemonic lines. 59 

Moods of the syllogism 59 

Nature, uniformity of 66 

Naming 81 

Negative judgment. 43 

Negative premises 57 

New elements 27 

Neptune 77 

Newton 76 

Notion, general abstract ..21-28 

singular concrete 8 

Noun, common _ 21 

proper 21 

Number forms 29 

Peripherially initiated impulse 21 

Personal identity .86 

Particular judgment 47 

Poetry ..83 



Physiological processes in associa- 
tion 15 

Predicate ...44 

Premises, negative. 57 

Prodigies, mathematical.. _ 83 

Propositions _ 44 

kinds of 48 

Proper noun 21 

Qualitative judgment ...43 

Quotations 7, 20, 42, 51, 68, 69, 82 

Rayleigh, Lord .„_ _. 26 

Rank 37 

Reasoning 64 

deductive 64 

inductive 64 

children's 87 

Recognition.. _ ...78 

Reflexes 88 

Relation 8 

Relations of propositions... 48 

Relation diagram 48 

Resemblances, table of 27 

Resimilation 16 

Sensations, faint 21 

vivid 21 

Sameness 86 

Subject ..44 

Summum genus ...39 

Superstitions 67, 73 

Syllogism 51 

figures of 57 



limitations of 62 

moods of 59 

Table of resemblances ...27 

differences ...26 

Thought, train of 8 

Thinking _ 82 

Titchener, formula for association. .14 

Undistributed term 52 

Uniformity of nature... 66 

Universal judgment. 26 

Uranus 72, 74 

Verification of hypothesis 76 

Wit _ 83 

QUOTATIONS 

Baldwin 24,32 

Binet _ 7 

Bain 21 

Hamilton _..20 

Haeckel 57 

Hoffding. 8, 62, 70, 82 

Huxley ,7, 70 

James 7, 62,82 

Jevons 20, 42, 59, 62, 70 

LeBon. ...70 

Morgan, Lloyd... 62 

Pillsbury ...7,40 

Spencer 7, 8, 57 

Thorndike ..20 

Ziehen _ 7, 8, 42. 51 



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